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A fundamental understanding of the complexities comprising an information security
strategy (ISS) in an organization is lacking. Most ISS implementations in government
organizations equate anti-virus or installing a firewall to that of an ISS. While use of hardware
and software forms a good defense; neither comprises the essence of an ISS. The ISS best
integrates with business and information system strategies from the start, forming and shaping
the direction of overall strategy synergistically within large government organizations. The
researcher used grounded theory and investigated what a large government organization’s
choices were with the differing roles an information security professional (ISP) chooses to
operate with and to develop an information security program. Analysis of the data collected
from interviewing 32 chief information security officers (CISOs) revealed how CISOs viewed
their programs, aligned their goals in the organization, and selected role(s) to execute strategy.
Use of grounded theory coding practices of the interviews showed a deficit in complexities of an
ISS and a lack of an ISS in the majority of organizations. The participants came from multiple
organizations in the National Capital Region on the east coast of the United States. This study
advances the body of knowledge in a qualitative understanding of actions taken by CISOs to
select a direction towards ISS implementation, role selection, and development of information
security programs. It provides a theory for further testing of strategy development and role
maturity.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
1.1 Evidence of the Problem
Traditionally, business forms the overall strategic direction of an organization through its
vision disseminated in the business strategy (Cohen & Cyert, 1973; Miller, 1981; Wommack,
1979). With the advent of automation, the information technology department or function
creates the information systems strategy to automate and align to the vision of the business
strategy (Doherty & Fulford, 2006). The speed and breadth with which information systems
penetrated business brought about the need for information systems to consider information
security for two reasons. First, to protect the information entrusted to the organization residing
in their information systems; second, to keep information technology assets defended from being
vulnerable from compromise; and to keep the information owners apprised as to whether a
breach occurs with their data and their automated information systems become compromised
(Gilbert, 2008; McFadzean, Ezingeard, & Birchall, 2011; Smedinghoff, 2005). Through this,
business and information technology are concerned with information security, to ensure an
information system’s usefulness to their users (Eloff & von Solms, 2000).
One of senior management’s objectives is to ensure the prevention of data loss and avoid
possible damage to their organizational reputation. Another objective focuses on building
defenses to protect automation assets to prevent compromise (Anderson, 2003; Dlamini, Eloff, &
Eloff, 2009; Dutta & McCrohan, 2002; Knapp & Boulton, 2006). An organization’s reputation
and possibly their economic survival depends upon having a secure environment as one of the
important factors to operate securely from malicious threats, such as individuals trying to
1

socially engineer passwords and user names from unsuspecting personnel on the network, who
could then infiltrate the network to exfiltrate information by siphoning activities (Bhalla, 2003;
Hinde, 2003; Knapp & Boulton, 2006; Oreku & Mtenzi, 2009). The costs associated with
remediating data breaches such as notifying victims of lost data and repair of public trust can be
excessive (Baskerville, 1993; Doherty & Fulford, 2006; Dutta & McCrohan, 2002; Garg, Curtis,
& Halper, 2003; Rowe & Gallaher, 2006). The organization, through senior management
interaction seeks to have an effective information security strategy in place (Kayworth &
Whitten, 2010; Loveland & Lobel, 2011).
The term information security strategy is often misunderstood. Organizational
management views it as a necessary implementation of technical security controls and devices to
keep people out of the organization’s computers (Chang & Yeh, 2006). Information security is
more than just technical security measures implemented, to meet regulatory demands
(Damianides, 2005; Doherty & Fulford, 2006; Keen & El Sawy, 2010; Kim, 2004; Luftman &
Ben-Zvi, 2010; Luftman & Ben-Zvi, 2011). Information security works with information
technology to ensure the automated environment remains secure, preventing outside infiltration
and internal misuse of devices and systems. Specifically, information security requires policy
and governance (Posthumous & von Solms, 2004; von Solms 2006) and an information security
strategy containing structured actions to meet an organization’s policy and governance (White &
Bruton, 2011); orchestrating an overall plan of action for the organization. The information
security function within an organization works to formalize the information security strategy, a
plan to implement protection of the information and intellectual property the organization uses to
conduct business (Chen, Kataria, & Krishnan, 2011; Hinde, 2003; Knapp & Boulton, 2006;
Mahmood, Siponen, Straub, Rao, & Raghu, 2010) from attackers who attempt to copy, delete,
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manipulate or destroy information. Information security needs to somehow remain one step
ahead of attackers (Bhalla, 2003; Gupta & Hammond, 2005; Howard & Longstaff, 1998).
1.2 Research Problem
In the literature there has been a call for a formal approach to information security that
goes beyond implementation of technical controls (Dhillon, 1995; Herath & Rao, 2009; Ma,
Johnston, & Pearson, 2008; Parkin & van Moorsel, 2009; Parakktu, 2010). Some researchers
have emphasized the need for well developed strategies (Anderson & Choobineh, 2008; Hall,
Sarkani, & Mazzuchi, 2011; Kayworth & Whitten, 2010; McFadzean, Ezingeard, & Birchall,
2011; Park & Ruighaver, 2008; Tejay, 2008). There has also been a call for information security
to be more proactive rather than being reactive (Tejay, 2008). However, there is a dearth of
studies focusing on the subject of information security strategy itself. The purpose of this study
is to understand the complexities of information security strategy in a large government
organization.
Exploring the problem examines the complexities of information security strategy
primarily in what the differing roles an information security professional chooses to operate and
how a large government organization proceeds to develop an information security program
through the strategy. The latter, how an organization proceeds specifically to develop
information security programs is with the vehicle defined as an information security strategy.
Delving into the information security strategy composition and answering what an information
security strategy means might grant insight into its construction. Looking into the construction
can help to ascertain whether certain types of information security strategy are preferable over
other forms of information security strategy under certain conditions. If so, it would also be
helpful to understand how information security strategies differ within a large governmental
3

organization under study. Then, assuming there are multiple types of information security
strategies, it would be helpful to search for ways in which an information security professional
differentiates one information security strategy from another by performing appropriate roles to
implement information security.
With the second area, when an information security professional differentiates one
information security strategy from another, the person assumes a strategic role in order to
perform information security duties. The process of selection leads to exploring the various
strategic roles available for the information security professional towards accomplishment of
information security. Various aspects of the roles and their selection were explored to assist in
furthering an understanding of the process. This effort looks at what the other roles used for
information security accomplishment are and what differentiates one role from another, whether
each role involves a formal process, and if there is an optimum role for a specific information
security strategy.
The argument of this study is that the literature is silent on role selection and explaining
how a large governmental organization develops roles. There is a need to investigate what
different roles are being used by government organizations. It would be of assistance to
understand which types of information security strategy were preferable over other forms of
information security strategy and under certain conditions. If so, it would be helpful to
understand how a large, multifaceted government organization differs within one another in the
accomplishment of information security. Most actions by an information security professional
tend to be in response to an action, instead of methodically planning out responses. These
reactive responses often lead to sometimes choosing incorrectly for given information security
needs. In order to mitigate the reactive approaches, an information security professional should
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evaluate the existing security strategies adopted by various organizations. The professional
should be able to categorize the observed strategies of other organizations and select the correct
direction to move an organization forward to meet the mission specified in the information
security program.
Whether consciously or not, organizations do take actions related to information security.
There is a need to understand those actions. They are the organization’s strategies. Tejay (2008)
argued the need to pay attention to the context of an organization in order to be successful.
There must be an understanding of the connection between what the information security
strategy requires and the role(s) necessary to work out the tenets of the information security
strategy. Differing business and information systems requirements drive the contexts with which
the information security professional connects the information security strategy to meet
objectives of information security. It would be helpful to understand how different information
security strategies actually in use in different organizations emphasize meeting their objectives
(McFadzean, Ezingeard, & Birchall, 2007; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985).

To this end, the goal

would be to produce a theoretical model from the collected data. In Chapter 3, a complete
discourse covered how the collected data was solicited from professionals and used to construct a
possible theoretical model for use in large governmental organizations. This may assist in future
studies to understand how organizations differ, utilizing the model to predict role selection. The
use of grounded theory research by data collection techniques allowed the emergent data to feed
the building of a theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Corbin & Strauss 2008).
1.3 Definitions
One attribute of establishing understanding is to have a common core of communications
between all stakeholders. This can be realized through the establishment of a common lexicon, a
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taxonomy of definitions, considering the positions other researchers have adopted and share in
common (Alter, 2008). A common lexicon assists people in communicating principles and
convey meaning, especially in the area of strategy.
The vast coverage of information systems has had an influence in the field of business
strategic management (Chan & Huff, 1992) and has influenced information systems strategy
(Chen, et al., 2010). Some discussion has taken place with information security strategy as well
(Baskerville & Dhillon, 2008; Ezingread, et al., 2005; McFadzean, et al., 2007; McFadzean, et
al., 2011). In this chapter a discussion of strategy from the literature in three areas and moves
through definitions of business strategy, information systems strategy and information security
strategy.
1.3.1 Strategy.
Gavetti and Rivkin (2005) stated strategy is about choice, choosing what to do and what
not to do, which affects the outcomes of an organization. While their article focused on choice,
other articles focus on exactly what a strategy is (Alter, 2008; Gavetti & Rivkin, 2005;
Mintzberg, 1987a; Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 1998; Wommack, 1979), what a strategy is
composed of (Cohen & Cyert, 1973), and how to develop and shape strategy (Gavetti & Rivkin,
2005; Wommack, 1979). Many researchers have devised models for strategies (Dunkerley,
2011; Ezingeard, et.al., 2005; Kankankalli, Tan, Teo, & Wei, 2003; Ma, Johnston, & Pearson,
2008; McClean & Kark, 2010; Rose, 2011), which attempts to capture the essence of strategy,
but none have received discipline wide acceptance (Markides, 1999). Some of these models
include Porter’s five-forces model (Porter, 1980), and eight more are explained by Mintzberg &
Waters (1985) for structuring strategy. The difficulty in an established definition might be
explained more easily if consideration of two other aspects of strategy were reviewed, that of the
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characteristics of decision making with strategy, and the issues around the differing levels of
strategy.
The second subset of strategy is characteristics of decision making. This is the decision
between strategic and non-strategic matters over the long term, their expected impacts, and the
directional movement of strategy by decisions being made while performing the plan (Chen, et
al., 2010). The third aspect is over the level in which a strategy operates. Some identify the
corporate level (Porter, 1980), the competitive advantage level (Grant, 2005), and the functional
strategy or resource allocation level (Hofer & Schendel, 1978). Others liken the strategy to the
strategic, tactical, and operational levels respectively of a complete strategy (Grobler &
Louwrens, 2005; da Veiga & Eloff, 2007). Either of these choices drives a strategy into
managing the direction of an organization towards achieving a goal.
The strategy as a management plan of action is to achieve an objective, identified by
milestones or markers to show progress towards achieving the objective (Chen, et al., 2010;
King, 1978). This study observes the strategy in three areas of an organization, the business,
information systems, and information security units based upon the business of the organization
(McFadzean, et al., 2007).
1.3.2 Strategy in Business
Strategy in business is the integration of an organization’s goals, policies, and actions,
which appears as a plan or pattern of a cohesive whole (Tejay, 2008). In ‘Crafting strategy’,
Mintzberg (1987b, In Tejay 2008) defined strategy as the five ‘P’s’, which are plan, ploy,
pattern, position, and perspective. More specifically, Mintzberg stated:
“…strategy can be defined as (1) a plan (i.e., some sort of consciously intended
course of action); (2) a ploy (which is a specific maneuver intended to outperform
a competitor); (3) a pattern (i.e., a stream of realized actions); (4) a position (i.e. a
means of matching between an organization and its external environment); and
7

(5) a perspective (which is shared among organizational members, and the content
of which consists of not just a position, but also an ingrained way of perceiving
the world) (Mintzberg, 1987, In Chen, et al., 2010).”
1.3.3 Information Systems Strategy
A majority of the literature defines information systems strategy as an outgrowth of
business strategy, in how to calculate the output of information systems in order to maximize
profits (Chen, et al., 2010). King (1978) states management information systems should
contribute by increasing earnings, reducing resources, and increasing reputation. Supporting
this, Mata, Fuerst, and Barney (1995) stated information technology is one of the sources for
sustaining competitive advantage by reducing costs and or increasing revenue. Johnson and
Lederer (2010) built upon the previous by saying the information system’s contribution has a
fivefold strategic contribution: customer satisfaction, sales revenue, market share, return on
investment, and operating efficiency. In all, information systems strategy supports the
organization’s strategy to increase the output of the organization and streamlining output through
information systems (Chen, et al., 2010).
1.3.4 Information Systems Security
Traditionally, information systems security is perceived to mainly secure the technical
and operational aspects of an information system, to protect the data (Anderson, 2003; de Paula,
Ding, Dourish, Nies, Pillet, Redmiles, Ren, Rode, & Filho, 2005; Dutta & McCrohan, 2002;
Kim, 2004; Ruighaver, 2008; Vijayan, 2005; Zhang & Bao; 2010). There is however, a lack of
an acceptable definition across the industry for an information security strategy which hampers
the acceptance of a common definition (Alter, 2008; Anderson, 2003). Strategy as presented by
White & Bruton (2011), states, “Strategy is a coordinated set of actions that fulfill a firm’s
objectives, purposes, and goals.” Which leads into an observation by Baskerville and Dhillon
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(2008), that the term strategy is used very loosely in the literature, even though strategy is quite
complex.
The complexity can be seen in how Mintzberg (1987b) examined five views of managing
strategy as a plan, ploy, pattern, positioning, and a perspective. To which Baskerville and
Dhillon (2008) expand upon the definition, into ten different methods for managing strategy
through the schools of prescriptive areas of designing and planning, and descriptive areas of
entrepreneurial, cognitive, learning, power, culture, environmental, and configuration.
Individually, they are all aspects of strategy, but together, even though they differ, they give a
more holistic view of strategy and its aspects (Baskerville & Dhillon, 2008). The word chosen
by Baskerville and Dhillon (2008) is conflated, to describe the meshing, but no specific term or
combination of terms that embodies all of ‘strategy’, rather it is a mixture and the resulting
selection that gave meaning to the term strategy.
1.3.5 Information Security Strategy
Information security strategy fits within an organizational structure as the vision of the
security of information, providing direction for policy, contributing to governance and
governance balancing control through compliance in a synergistic relationship of information
security management (Klaić, 2010; Posthumus & von Solms, 2004). The methods chosen for
implementation of an information security strategy consisted of choices, the choice of the
alignment and the role to execute the information security strategy to contribute to “an overall
plan for managing and developing an organization’s information security,” (Baskerville &
Dhillon, 2008). This then is the chosen definition of an information security strategy.
This research included articles which stated information security strategy should be
aligned with business strategy, (Caralli, 2004; Dhillon, 1995; Newkirk, Lederer, & Johnson,
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2008). The literature defines several broad concepts for aligning business strategy with
information systems strategy (Chan & Huff, 1992; Chen, et al., 2010), but not many studies
discuss the alignment of information security strategy (Hall, Sarkoni, & Mazzuchi, 2011;
McFadzean, et al., 2011).
To reiterate, the industry looks at information security as an afterthought applied to
obtain accreditation or answer problems when a compromise takes place. Information security
ends up as a reactive response rather than a proactive implementation to mitigate problems
before the problem can cause a compromise (Hedström, Kolkowska, Karlsson, & Allen, 2011;
Hu, Hart, & Cooke, 2007; Scully, 2011).
Having defined the terms forming the common core of strategy, the following sections
delineate coverage of the information security strategy. Chapter 2 covered the treatment of the
literature around the alignments and strategic roles of an information security strategy. Chapter
3 introduced the research method chosen to interact with, observe, capture, and analyze the
actions of information security professionals in choosing roles. Chapter 3 discussed data
collection and the results of the data collection. Chapter 4 analyzes the data to yield a theory of
information security strategy in large government organizations. The conclusion, in Chapter 5
delineates the contribution to the field of knowledge in information security, and recommends
future areas of research.

10

Chapter 2
Review of the Literature
2.1 Introduction
The literature covered a broad swath of information security, since the field of
information security is relatively young and still forming (Anderson, 2003; Kritzinger & Smith,
2008). This research included articles from a spectrum of information security (governance,
policy, management, and compliance) containing sections and items of interest having a direct
bearing on strategy (Klaić, 2010; Kritzinger & Smith, 2008; Ohki, Harada, Kawaguchi, Shiozaki,
& Kagaua, 2009; Siponen, 2005b).
2.2 Review of the Literature
In many journal articles, the subject of information security strategy was broached, but
not directly addressed as such. Authors may not have concerned themselves directly with a
discussion of strategy, but did inject references as to vision and contribution to an overall plan of
management and development of information security (Bhalla, 2003; Damianides, 2005; Doherty
& Fulford, 2005; Doherty & Fulford, 2006). The researcher identified direct and indirect
references to information security strategy and categorized them into terms captured in Table 1,
Definition Sources.
Forming the information security strategy embodied the outlook of the leader and the
organization, which was their vision (Salmela & Spil, 2002). The information security strategy
was the outcome of taking the vision’s goals, objectives and priorities and matching them to the
organizational strategy (Moen & Norman, 2000; Salmela & Spil, 2002). Subsequent steps in the
information security strategy development process included consideration of strategic, tactical,
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and operational goals of the organization (da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; Grobler & Louwrens, 2005).
Table 1, Definition Sources identifies the multiple terms used and ways in which contributions
Table 1. Definition Sources
Term used
Cybersecurity
-Architecture
-Managerial
-Security policy
Cybersecurity Strategy

Enterprise Strategic Security
Information Assurance
Strategy
Information Security
Management Strategy

Inductive Strategy
Information Security
Planning
Information Security
Strategy (with propositions)

Information Systems
Security Strategy

IT Security Strategy
Intrusion Strategy
Defense in Depth Strategy
IT Information Strategy
IT Security Strategy
(Law Enforcement) Strategy
Security initiatives
Security Strategy

Strategy

Strategic Change

Explanation
Security was part of the overall strategy

Source
Knapp & Boulton, 2006;
McFadzean, Ezingeard, & Birchall,
2007

Advantages and disadvantages revealed in strategies as proactive and
reactive
“Protect digital assets” of people and organizations
Measured at every level, associated with risk acceptance
Aligning with corporate strategy to provide best security and
availability of information assets
Security strategy as a part of governance, a driver of the organization
Used management to implement a strategic approach to security
Information security management strategy and how it aligned with
business
Used to understand individual and organizational levels
Though not defined, a strategy of risk planning prevailed

Rowe & Gallaher 2006

Part of security governance along with responsibilities long and short
term; A part of the overall program
Approaches to answering risks and costs
Strategically aligned with business; Information Security Strategy aligns
with business strategy; Aligns with business strategy to combine
business objectives and competitive advantages; Embodied the plan to
align with corporate strategy; Was a key enabler of corporate strategy

Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; Shoraka
2011
Daneva, 2006
Amaio, 2009; Chang & Ho, 2006;
Dynes, Kolbe, & Schierholz, 2007;
Hall, Sarkani, & Mazzuchi, 2011;
Kayworth & Whitten, 2010; van
Niekerk & von Solms, 2010
Arce & Levy, 2009
Vasiu, Mackay, & Warren, (2003)
Lomprey, 2008

Pro-active to identify and adopt strategy
Leads to competitive advantage
Factors for contextual background, common threats, and addresses
barriers
Information Security Strategy supported strong protection of patient
records
Directors used risk assessment to draft the information security strategy
Information Security Strategy as a technical remediation response
Information security strategy as a part of the governance structure
Information Security Strategy along with capabilities yields
organizational performance
Strategy inferred as a part of managing and not a technical solution for
implementation
Well-developed strategies result from balanced strategies in business,
information systems and information system security strategies
Alignment of business with security strategy and also discusses in great
detail about strategic integration to support business strategy
Evaluation of risk resulted in IT security strategy
Technical focus on devices and lock-down of systems
Compared nature to the methods of strategy

Ghernouti-Hélie, 2010
Anderson & Choobineh, 2008
Ezingeard, McFadzean, & Birchall,
2005
Grobler & Louwrens, 2005
Doherty & Fulford, 2005
Ma, Johnson, & Pearson, 2008
Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2009
Straub & Welke, 1998

Love, 2011
McFadzean, et al., 2007
Park & Ruighaver, 2008
Posthumus & von Solms, 2004
Hall, Sarkani, & Mazzuchi, 2010
Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006
Chang & Yeh, 2006
McFadzean, et al., 2011
Goluch, et. al., 2008
Doughty, 2003
Oreku & Mtenzi, 2009

Security approached strategically
IT Security Strategy as a part of risk analysis

Von Solms, 2006
Von Solms, 1998a

Design strategy from the beginning, then built in afterwards
Aligned strategy with business strategy
Formulation of security strategy involved people and processes
Compared cost and benefits weighing risks
Methods for instituting strategy through committees for implementation
Integrated part of the overall strategy
Defined as formulating according to the scenarios encountered
Proactive protection needed strategy to be proactive
Strategic change enables business goals as new requirements or
capabilities emerge

Anderson & Moore, 2006
Booker, 2006
Zhang & Bao, 2010
Geer, 2007
Smith, 2004
Ahuja, 2009
Abbas & Hemani, 2010
Bhalla, 2003
Werlinger, Hawkey, & Beznosov,
2009
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were made to an information security strategy. The following captures how these definition
sources aligned with information security and the information security strategy. These usually
mapped to long range for strategic, mid-range for tactical and short range for operational goals.
The information security strategy was divided into three sections allowing personnel to track
short, mid, and long range periods of time (King, 1978; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Wommack,
1979). Benchmarks or milestones helped to indicate markers for effective performance in
security (Allen, 2005; Eloff & von Solms, 2000; McFadzean, et al., 2011; Ohki, et al., 2009). If
the information security strategy underperformed, it frequently manifested problems at the
tactical and operational levels within an organization (da Veiga & Eloff, 2007). Problems could
occur even before an information security strategy was ever implemented in an organization
(Scully, 2011). An indication of this might be writing, approving, and then filing away of the
information security strategy before anyone ever acted upon it (Rose, 2011). In which case,
people or personnel duly responsible for accomplishment of the ideals of the information
security strategy may never have known about the strategy. Practical pressures to meet
operational or tactical requirements intervened and in such cases, the strategy was put away until
time was available to complete the goals of even the operational level (da Veiga & Eloff, 2007;
Grobler & Louwrens, 2005). The factors involved with these events are complex and diverse.
Information security has worked to correctly identify, analyze, and correlate
organizational factors to improve information security strategy formulation, development, and
implementation (Chang & Ho, 2006; Hu, Hart, & Cooke, 2007; Kankanhalli, et al., 2003;
Parakkattu, et al., 2010). Through this process, the information security strategy advanced from
merely being technical solutions to secure entry and exit points of a network (Ghernouti-Helie,
2010; Hinde, 2003; Seeholzer, 2012; Zhang & Bao, 2010) to become fully developed plans of
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action (Aivazian, 1998; Bower & Gilbert, 2007). The information security strategy has even
progressed above the stage of composing and implementing many information security
management products, such as: policies, checklists, guidebooks, creating multiple governance
structures, and identifying many success and effectiveness frameworks (Dunkerley & Tejay,
2009; Eloff & von Solms, 2000; Goluch, Ekelhart, Fenz, Jakoubi, Tjoa, & Mück, 2008, Siponen,
2005b; Zhang, Wuwang, Li, & Zhang, 2010).
What remained in question was why an information security strategy still did not function
properly within the structure of policy and governance in the hierarchy of information security
management within an organization (Cecere, 2011; Dawson, Berrell, Rahim, & Brewster, 2010;
Dhillon, 2007; Kotulic & Clark, 2004; McFadzean, et al., 2007; Wang, 2009, Wood 2000). This
study collected data about interactions of information security professionals and the roles chosen
to implement information security and analyzed the data to result in a theory.
In some organizations, security was performed at minimum levels, in order to gain initial
approval to connect to or operate the network (Anderson & Moore, 2006; Wang, 2009).
Afterwards, the organizations relegated security to the level of necessity in order to maintain
approval for operational use. Organizations then became complacent about continued use
(Dougherty & Fulford, 2005). Evident of this was the fact that organizations conducted many
meetings about implementing strategy, but ended up putting off difficult decisions (Wommack,
1979). Organizations implemented a form of security, such as technical security controls to deal
with known threats (Damianides, 2005; Gilbert, 2008; Smedinghoff, 2005), but often choose not
to employ management of information security to look for the unknown threat, before or as it
developed (Anderson, 1993; Butler & Gray, 2006; Dhillon, 1995). Rather, organizations only
implemented regulatory requirements, mandated by law. A prevailing presumption was that
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security only slowed down the speed of processing on computer systems (Post & Kagan, 2007;
Scully, 2011).
Some of the factors used to explain this strategic approach concerned a management
approach wherein they were aware of security threats, but refused to believe bad events would
happen to them (Knapp & Boulton, 2006; Scully, 2011). In spite of the security threats,
management became self-assured, believing they were invincible and data loss would not happen
to them (Scully, 2011; Straub, 1990). Possibly, the largest initial hindrance came from program
managers, who were charged to keep their programs on time, under budget, and over utilized
constrained resources, which invariably ended up as a detriment of security, which eventually
removed or limited security from the budget (Hinde, 2000; Kark, 2010; Wang, 2009).
Ideally, the information security strategy developed by organizations evolved from
interaction with multiple information security professionals. Their experiences in executing
duties were applied to fulfill their portion of the business strategy, information systems strategy,
and the information security strategy (Anderson & Choobineh, 2008; Hall, Sarkoni, & Mazzuchi,
2011; Knapp & Boulton, 2006; Parakkattu & Kunnathur, 2010). A method such as compliance,
used security controls alone, in order to achieve a minimum level of security. Compliance
dominated the Federal sector of organizations (Dhillon, 1995; Herath & Rao, 2009; Ma,
Johnston, & Pearson, 2008; Ma, Schmidt, Pearson, 2009; Siponen, 2006). Compliance was
undertaken, to meet legal mandates such as the Federal Information Security Management Act
(FISMA) and the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), as the
regulating documents of information security (Damianides, 2005). Other organizations used
compliance methods such as those for financial organizations using the Graham Leach Bliley
Act (GLBA) and or industry regulation under the Payment Card Industry Data Security
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Standards (PCI-DSS) for protection of personal financial information (Al-Hamdini, 2009;
Damianides, 2005; Gilbert, 2008; Smedinghoff, 2005). Still other methods that information
security professionals utilized in information security strategy formulation resulted from the
reorganization of the information security structure or the hierarchy of the information security
functions within their organization. Reorganization is done to meet new business and or
information systems goals set forth from management or to address shortfalls identified and
addressed through moving or restructuring of the organization (Avgerou & McGrath, 2007;
Cecere, 2008; Hansen, et al., 2011; Kajava & Siponnen, 1996; Kotulic & Clark, 2004).
Compliance and reorganization formed partial responses to the problem investigated, but
the study looked at the properties of the concepts of strategy (Smith & Medin, 1981). It focused
on the linkages between the alignments of strategic roles under an information security strategy
(Chen, et al., 2010; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Ezingeard, et al., 2005; Leidner, Lo, & Preston,
2011; McFadzean, et al., 2007; Smith & Medin, 1981). The links between the strategies and each
of the strategic roles were very complex and intricate (Leidner, et al., 2011). The discussion
started with an explanation of the properties of the strategic concepts and their alignments (Chen,
et al., 2010; Corbin & Strauss, 2008). As an overview, the alignment of the information security
strategy used within the structure of an organization addressed the security of the business
strategy and its automation through information systems. The alignment an organization should
take was to aim towards a secure, information exchanging environment (Howard & Longstaff,
1998; McFadzean, et al., 2011). The alignment of an information security strategy provided the
projected goals, objectives, and priorities the organization needs to attain for a secure,
information exchanging environment (Bruton & White, 2011; Doherty & Fulford, 2006;
Newkirk, et al., 2008).
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There were many studies existing in business strategy and information systems to analyze
the alignment of goals to mission and vision in their strategies (Chan & Reich, 2007; Earl, 1993;
Johnson & Lederer, 2010; Mata, et al., 1995; Posthumus & von Solms, 2004; Preston &
Karahanna, 2009; Salmela & Spil, 2002; Stanton, Guzman, Stam, & Caldera, 2003; Westerman,
2009). However, not many discuss the alignment of information security strategy to either
information systems or business level strategies (Leidner, et al., 2011; McFadzean, et al, 2007;
Newkirk, et al., 2008; Tejay, 2008). Discussion in the following section covers the areas of
alignment unique to the information security strategy for the concepts of strategy.
2.3 Current Alignments for an Information Security Strategy
This section discusses the aligning of the information security strategy to explain the
ways in which strategy was performed. There is school of thought that there are many different
fashions in which to execute strategy. A total of four, possibly five methods existed for aligning
information security strategy. The primary strategy is the business strategy, without which the
organization would cease to exist. Also, an organization could not exist with only an
information systems or information security strategy alone. Therefore, an information security
strategy without a business strategy would result in failure of the organization.
The other four methods of aligning strategy focused in on information security strategy, which
were: working with the business strategy in alignment of the information security strategy to the
business strategy, alignment of the business strategy to the information systems strategy,
alignment of the information security strategy to both the business and information systems
strategies, allowing the information security strategy to operate on its own, and when the
information security strategy was non-existent, operations does not consciously use any
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information security strategy to perform its mission. Refer to Table 2, Alignments with
Information Security Strategy for a description of the alignments.
Table 2. Alignments with Information Security Strategy
Information
Security
Strategy

Primary
view of
strategy,
applying
Mintzberg
(1987b) 5P’s

Assumptions related to the information
security strategy development process

Starting
point when
developing
information
security
strategy
Used
business
Strategy as
guide

Standpoint
taken when
developing
information
security
strategy
BusinessCentric

Align to
business

Plan,
supported
the
organization
directly

Align to
Information
Systems

Position,
found the
niche within
Information
Systems
Plan &
Position,
supported &
found the
niche

Used
Information
Systems
Strategy as
guide
Used both
Business &
Information
Systems
Strategies

Information
Systems
Centric

Operated
on its own

Perspective,
focused on
strict role of
law

Used law &
regulation as
guide

Business &
Organizatio
n Centric

Was nonexistent

Ploy, as it
changed
according to
the flow

Used
information
Security
Professional
attitude
towards
strategy

Organizatio
n Centric

Align to
Information
Systems
and
Business

Business &
Information
Systems
Centric

Assumptions
related to
information
security strategy’s
impact and
desired impact of
information
security strategy

Assumptions
related to
information
security
strategy/Busin
ess strategic
alignment

Ensured meeting
goals in line with
business strategy

Met the
strategy

Ensured meeting
goals in line with
Information
Systems Strategy

Assisted the
strategy
through
information
systems
Met/Assisted
the strategy
through
information
systems

Relationship
between IS and
Business
strategy

Information
security
strategy
developed
along with
Business
Information
Security
Strategy
develops from
both
Information
Security
Strategy
developed
from both
Business &
Information
Systems
Strategy
Information
Security
Strategy
developed in
isolation, met
Information
Security
Requirements
Information
Security
Strategy was
not really
developed, it
may result as
an after action
or gap analysis

Ensured meeting
goals in line with
Business &
Information
Systems
Strategies

Identified asset
requirement and
ensured
awareness

Informed the
strategy of
requirements

Provided an
understanding of
security and
follows ISP
guidance

Met the
Information
Security
Professionals
requirements
for strategy
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Each type of strategy set a vision, defined the mission and asserted the activities
necessary for the implementation of strategy (Anderson & Choobinah, 2008; Cohen & Cyert,
1973; Kankankalli, et al., 2003; Kotulic & Clark, 2004; Mintzberg & Waters, 1987). A majority
of literature identified the need for alignment, but most of the focus was on information systems
alignment to business strategy. Very little literature existed to cover information security
strategy aligning to either business or information systems (Newkirk, et al., 2008; Rudd,
Greenley, Beatson, & Lings, 2008; Thompson & James, 2001).
The information security strategy supported information systems and the business
strategy to secure the information of the business (Alter, 2008; Chen, et al., 2010; Stanton, et al.,
2003). Protecting information and information systems at all levels becomes complex and
diverse (Leidner, et al., 2011). Part of the process of meshing information and information
systems together was identified within the difficulties of aligning strategies (Doherty & Fulford,
2006; Segars & Grover, 1998). An area, researchers have studied was the integration of
information security strategy to business strategy (Newkirk, et al., 2008; Tejay 2008) and the
information security strategy to information systems (Dutta & McCrohan, 2002; Straub &
Welke, 1998).
One of the alignments of the information systems strategy was that of information
systems strategy aligning completely with the business strategy through automation of data
process, input, storage, and output (Chen, et al., 2010; Stanton, et al., 2003). Another
information security strategy was discussed as that of aligning to the business strategy by
transparently passing through the information systems strategy. This information system
alignment was concerned only with automating the business strategy (Chen, et al., 2010). A
further case was one in which the information security strategy supported only one of the
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strategies, such as the business or information systems strategies, this aligned only with that
specific strategy, ignoring the other strategy (Caralli, 2004; Hall, et al., 2010; McFadzean, et al.,
2011). The last type of strategy, called a non-existent strategy, had the information security
program operating entirely on its own with no form or distinct process. However in reality, the
aspect of no strategy would quickly evolve into adopting the business strategy, since information
security operates within an organization and its existing structure.
Table 2, Alignments with Information Security Strategy, summarized the five alignment
concepts of strategy and how they relate to definition, the assumption of information security
strategy development, the impact of the desired information security strategy assumption, and the
outcomes when assessed with the overall business strategy. The following sections briefly detail
the concepts of alignment through strategy types.
2.3.1 Align to Business Strategy
Aligns to business strategy has the information security strategy aligned to the business
strategy (Caralli, 2004). This identified the first concept of how alignment of the strategy was
performed within an organization (Siponen, 2005b; Westerman, 2009). The information security
strategy was written to follow or augment the requirements of the business strategy (Cerpa &
Verner, 1999; Hall, et al., 2010; McFadzean, et al., 2007; McFadzean, et al., 2011; Parkin & van
Moorsel, 2009). Communicating information security in business terms, while maintaining the
security of the organization helped align the two strategies (von Solms & von Solms , 2004; von
Solms & von Solms, 2005). The challenge was in explaining the information security strategy in
understandable language for the business executive to comprehend information security
(Lindström & Hägerfors, 2009). The information security strategy followed and worked with the
overall goals of the organization; drawing from the requirements set forth from the
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organization’s leadership (Hall, et al., 2010; Kayworth & Whitten, 2010). Alignment to the
business strategy also resulted in ensuring the accomplishments of the same, by meeting the
goals of the strategy (Amaio, 2009; Lomprey, 2008).
2.3.2 Align to Information Systems Strategy
The information security strategy used the information systems strategy as a guide. As
an overall objective, the information security strategy was developed in tandem with and aligned
to the information systems strategy. While the information systems strategy was often
information systems centric, the information security strategy attempted to ensure the secure
attainment of goals of the information systems strategy. The goals of information systems
helped to ensure information tools were readily available, but sometimes may not align with
business needs, thus not providing the organization with optimum value (Alter, 2008: Chen, et
al., 2010; Stanton, et al., 2003).
2.3.3 Aligns to Information Systems and Business Strategies
Information security strategy as the shared view of the information security program
goals in an organization aligned with both the information systems and business strategies.
Operating in the most proficient manner, to identify business opportunities and align them, along
with the most opportune automation techniques providing increased productivity and savings in
equipment costs by optimizing efficiencies between the information systems strategy and the
business strategy (Baptista, Newell, & Currie, 2010; Leidner, et al., 2011; Straub & Welke,
1998).
2.3.4 Information Security Strategy Operates on its Own
Alignment four covered the domain in which the information security strategy developed
almost in a vacuum and did not consider the business or information system strategies for
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development (Badr, Biennier, & Tata, 2010). For its focus, development occurred within its
own realm and might depend upon consideration of only federal law and regulation to specify
what the goals and objectives would be, regardless of the constraints of business and information
system requirements. Rather the information security strategy tended to be authoritative in
dictating what the requirements for compliance would be from the information system and
business strategy viewpoint (Eloff & von Solms, 2000; von Solms & von Solms, 2004).
2.3.5 Information Security Strategy is Non-Existent
Alignment five considered the lack of any organized strategy from the external sources of
business or information systems (Pfeffer, 1992). The information security strategy existed in the
form of interactions through an information security executive working on a day to day basis
(Mintzberg, 1987b; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Porter, 1996; Reich & Benbasat, 2000) without
any structured method in place. The executive provided direction, but without formalizing the
information security strategy in writing or other channels of communication to subordinates or
peers. Strategy resulted from periodic changes in direction of the senior executive on a continual
basis. Allen (2005) and Leidner, Lo, and Preston (2011) assert that security cannot be missing, it
must be represented.
2.3.6 Summary of the Alignments
Table 2, Alignments with Information Security Strategy, summarized and listed the
characteristics of all the alignments, listed as concepts, showing where they intersected as
distinct types of strategies. The author adapted the style of the table from the work by Chen,
Mocker, Preston, & Teubner (2010) into an information security strategy related structure. The
discussion of the alignments presented covered the most probable ways in which an information
security strategy could be developed; considering strategies which used business, information
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systems or both types of strategy to accomplish a mutual set of goals. In addition, another
alignment consisted of preparing a strategy running on its own to serve internal needs, but failed
to encompass overall organizational goals. If in the case of a new organization, not having a
strategy might comprise the only situation where it was advisable to have no strategy; but,
having none usually resulted in a very short sighted execution of duties and resulted in much rework and duplication of effort (Baskerville & Dhillon, 2007). The next section consists of
discussing the external influences upon the information security strategy, through the roles an
information security professional could exert over the information security strategy.
2.4 Proposing Role Recognition for an Information Security Strategy
Previous studies in information systems (Chen, et al., 2010) recognized three roles of
strategy performance (Information Systems Innovator, Information Systems Conservative, and
Information Systems Undefined), but opted not to explore other variables of roles in which to
perform the strategies. Leidner, Lo, and Preston (2011), built upon the original article by
including an additional role. They have suggested the addition of Information Systems
Ambidextrous (Leidner, et al., 2011), which attempted to capture additional variance of the three
roles. The necessary next step was to build upon the previous two studies by adding a workable
theory to test. To that end, a grounded theory approach might grant the emergence of a theory to
test (Pandit, 1996). In both works, the authors opted to keep the study in the theoretical realm
without conducting actual research into the validity of their propositions (Chen, et al., 2010;
Leidner, et al., 2011). Rather, they presented propositions that could lead to an intellectual basis
for discussion of information systems strategy to contribute to the field of information systems.
Since the actual study did not gather rigorous evidence, this study gained extensive data from
information security professionals and used a rigorous analysis reaching saturation under
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theoretical sampling (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2011; Devadas, Silong, & Ismail, 2011).
This study used the existing study (Chen, et al., 2010) to spur the validity of information security
strategy in qualified strategic role selection by information security professionals.
Studies identified the formal and informal interactions between business executives and
information systems executives and that those interactions had an impact on how information
systems implementation occurred (Pyburn, 1983; Johnson, 2009). Often the interactions were
rare, occurring sporadically during appraisals or when meeting to discuss strategy formation
(Johnson, 2009). Since the interactions were infrequent and that information systems were
viewed as coming into alignment with business goals, the qualified strategic roles proposed by
business might not always be coordinated with information systems. It was assumed information
systems follow business blindly (Pyburn, 1983). However, interactions do need to be
coordinated and communicated to yield an effective strategy.
With the definition of an information security strategy established as the implementation
of an information security strategy, it consisted of choices contributing to “an overall plan for
managing and developing an organization’s information security,” (Baskerville & Dhillon,
2007). Baskerville & Dhillon (2008) recognized a good information security strategy drove
information security policies that information security management used to implement
information security processes and practices. They asserted that an integrated strategy for
information security management was necessary to achieve organizational objectives.
Participants in securing information must clearly define their roles and responsibilities to achieve
objectives.
The implementation roles utilized by information security professionals varied by just as
many backgrounds as the individuals who implemented the information security strategy
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(Ashenden, 2012; von Solms, 2001). The intricate interplay of an information security
professional with business and information security executives is puzzling (Johnson, 2009). Part
of the puzzle was having information security management weigh their appropriate human
interactions (Ashenden, 2012), the preferences of the leader and selection of the category to
envelop their performance of the information security strategy under the information security
program. As a part of this equation, the qualified strategic roles information security
professionals chose from consisted of a set of broad categories identified in Table 3, Qualified
Strategic Roles of Information Security. These broad categories of qualified strategic roles for
implementing the information security strategy are identified as top down, public image,
competitor, continual change, best practices, re-organization, power relationships, and
compliance. In Table 3, a summation of the major roles information security professionals’
exhibit for implementing information security strategies are listed and briefly covered. The
following paragraphs give a more detailed review of the eight identified qualified strategic roles.
2.4.1 Top down
The positioning school of thought looks at strategy performance as a reasoned top down
approach, where executives moved and shifted strategy performance to take advantage of
positions as the leader sees the direction change (Slaughter, Levine, Ramesh, & Pries-Heje,
2006). The top down role managed from top to bottom, the executives became involved with
decisions and captured their vision in the strategy and policy, governing the actions of all
personnel within an organization (Baskerville & Dhillon, 2008; Clark & Sitko, 2008; Dawson, et
al., 2010; Kajava & Siponen, 1996; Lederer & Mendelow, 1988; Salmela & Spil, 2002). The
authority for decisions resided with the upper echelon and they directed the actions of all. In this
manner a select few made decisions for the greater good and it tied directly back to operations of
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Table 3. Qualified Strategic Roles of Information Security
Qualified
Strategic Role

Definition

Top Down

The strategy as a shell and have the insides declared by
outlining the goals, adding objectives and priorities over
time, allowing the strategy to develop inside of defined
boundaries.
Public image, the image was to contend for the public’s
opinion as a means by which security was not necessarily
observed, but perceived as implemented. Security became
an external façade, willing to pay fines than ensure security.

Public Image

Information Systems Source Information Security Source
Clark & Sitko, 2008; Jones,
2001; Kajava & Siponen,
1996
Anderson & Moore, 2006;
Knapp & Boulton, 2006

Competitor

The competitor or benchmark worked to achieve the best
Howard & Kilmartin, 2006; Damianides, 2005; Ohki,
condition. Competition could be like an arms race to devise Lacity & Hirscheim, 1995 et.al., 2006
strategies to outwit opponents. Innovation or
countermeasures produced to outperform each other
resulting in competition amongst the players.

Continual
Change

Strategy adapted to continuous and unpredictable change.
Information Security adjusted as threat actor intentions and
malware deployments changed. Strategy moved from a once
a year or longer cyclical repetition into an almost daily
operational change environment.
The best business practices (BBP) attempted to
institutionalize and accept best practices across the
organization. Use of methods such as an information
security capability maturity model, to find best practices.

Best Practice

Reorganization

Power
Relationship

Compliance

Used the excuse for organizational change as an argument,
that since security had deficiencies in the past, management
required a change in the structure of the organization; hoping
to stave off negative reactions, the organization re-organized.
This used the ISS to encourage organizational change.
Power exerted through the strategy, establishing
organizational direction. Individuals used strategy to
exercise will and or drive conformance by employees. Power
was wielded in two ways, effectively to advance
organizational goals and to coerce individuals and
organizations to achieve a short term objective, but usually
resulted in security being ineffective over time.
Compliance used federal laws to center the information
security strategy around. Compliance was very procedurally
oriented. People were not heavily involved with the process,
except to perform procedures, within the process.

Bechtold, 1997; Fairholm,
& Card, 2009; Huebler,
Foster, & Phelps, 2007;
Lacey, 2009; Levy, 1994;
Valle, 2000; Yarger, 2006
Keen & El Sawy, 2010;
Luftman & Kempaiah,
2008; von Solms, 2006

Collins, 2001

Dhillon, 2004; Dhillon,
Caldeira, & Wenger, 2011;
Herath & Rao, 2009;
Minztberg, 1985;

Lapke, 2008

Kark, Penn, & Dill, 2009;
Kark, 2010; Kayworth &
Whitten, 2010; Luftman &
Ben-Zvi, 2010; Luftman &
Ben-Zvi, 2011; McClean &
Kark, 2010
Aivazian, 1998; Norman &
Yasin, 2010; Zhang, et. al.,
2010

Damianides, 2005; De
Paula, et al., 2005; Gilbert,
2008; Hedström,
Kolkowska, Karlsson, &
Allen, 2011; Hu, Hart, &
Cooke, 2007; McFadzean, et
al., 2011; Siponen, 2005b;
Siponen, 2006;
Smedinghoff, 2005; von
Solms, 1998a; von Solms,
1998b;

the organization and conformed to regulatory guidance. Personnel often perceived this as an
umbrella form of strategy (Mintzberg & Waters, 1987). The overall direction was established by
management, the details were worked out as goals and objectives, added over time and as
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management revealed direction to fan out amongst the ribs of the umbrella (Jones, 2001;
Mintzberg & Waters, 1987).
2.4.2 Public Image
There was a perception that information security was required to protect users and assets
from various threats in the Internet directed towards the users (Huang, Rau & Salvendy, 2010).
The public image sought to display an image to the public of the organization as a secure
environment for information security. This was another role of an information security
professional to implement an information security strategy. The image contended for the
public’s opinion as a means by which security was not necessarily observed, but perceived to be
implemented, to the extent necessary to make an observer believe the organization was secure
and trusted (Knapp & Boulton, 2006). Mintzberg and McHugh (1985) asserted that
organizational strategy focused on form, but not substance. Part of the public image role was
projecting the stability of security, ensuring the customer and the organization as a whole has
confidence in the security of information entrusted to them (Johnson, 2009). Security became an
external façade, superficial in nature, which projected the image of security protecting the public
from actual security breaches (Baskerville, 1993). The organization asserted the existence of
security, yet when they suffered loss, the organization opted to just pay the fines assessed, rather
than invest sufficient funds to implement proper security measures. The cost of the fine was
lower than the cost of proper implementation of security controls (Anderson & Moore, 2006).
2.4.3 Competitor
The competitor role consisted of benchmarking or competition resulted in striving for top
position amongst organizations trying to achieve best condition. Each unit competed, trying to
outperform the other in providing security (Vannoy & Salam, 2010). Remaining secure was
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compared to an arms race to devise strategies that outwit opponents (Chang & Ho, 2006;
Robson, 2005). Each competitor created innovation or countermeasures to the innovation
produced by other competitors. Illustrative of this was the ‘Red Queen’ effect explained by
Robson (2005) and was the result of competitors competing against one another. Strategy strove
to maximize profits (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 1998; Vannoy & Salam, 2010).
Information security strategy looked to devise goals to keep out malware (Chan & Reich, 2007:
Chang & Ho, 2006; Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, Lampel, 1998; Tejay, 2008; Vannoy & Salam, 2010).
By adapting the ‘Red Queen’ effect, security became the objective and industry benefits when all
the parties attempt to eliminate all information security threats. Information security served to
spur more profits with proper implementation as competition drives down costs and ends up
preventing loss due to data breaches (Baskerville, 1993; Ohki, et al., 2009; Robson, 2005).
2.4.4 Continual Change.
One thought leader in the information systems technical and strategic areas predicted the
rise of chaos or continual change as the new normal within information technology (Costello,
2011). Costello (2011), stated information technology leaders and by extension information
security must prepare for rapid device, application, and services deployment. This continual
change portended that the current un-predictableness of an organization’s environment required
continuous changes in strategy to adapt to ever changing needs (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). For
business, information systems and information security strategy, they all needed to react to the
changing requirements of customers, information system assets and information handling.
Continual change became hard, especially when commensurate information security change is
required (Slater, 2002) and as threat actor intentions and malware deployment changed rapidly
(Choo, 2011). Strategy would need to move from a long cyclical period of time into a much
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shorter operational change environment. The continual change theory of strategy involved
nonlinear changes and accepting feedback that may cause program redirection, by either sudden
changes (bifurcation points) or more gradual evolution (Bechtold, 1997).
Continual change worked along a continuum, ranging between deliberate and emergent
strategy, but not at either of the extremes (Mintzberg & McHugh, 1985). One form of continual
change was that of adhocracy, where an organization worked in an environment that was both
complex and dynamic (Leidner, et al., 2011). The environment was always unique and changing
(Leidner, et al., 2011; Mintzberg & McHugh, 1985). Uniqueness was delineated in five areas,
first it was dynamic and complex with each output being unique. Second, different outputs
caused a need for experts to be resident. Third, experts were housed in teams, to address issues
as they arose. Fourth, mutual adjustment of strategy was coordinated through working groups
and committees. Lastly, organizations were decentralized, and power was distributed to task
accomplishment by experts within teams (Mintzberg & McHugh, 1985). Overall, the role of
continual change was one of dynamic and complex changes occurring continually.
2.4.5 Best Practice
The best business practices (BBP) attempted to ensure BBP institutionalization and
acceptance across the organization as a strategic role. The organization executed established
policy to obtain the best results when addressing security issues (Dawson, et al., 2010). One of
the methods information security personnel advanced was best practices in the form of a model
or method to mitigate risk in a repeatable fashion (Shariati, Bahmani, & Shams, 2010).
Rezakhani, Hajebi, and Mohammadi (2011) advanced standardization as a method of best
practices. They sought standardization across the industry and cited instances of standard
acceptance through programs such as Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL),
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Information Security Management System (ISMS), Information Security Maturity Management
Model (ISM3), International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International
Engineering Consortium (IEC) (Rezakhani, Hajebi, & Mohammadi, 2011). Use of methods such
as checklists, capability maturity models and other practices abound in best practices
environments (Baskerville, 1993; Shariati, Bahmani, & Shams, 2010; von Solms & von Solms,
2005; Zuccato, 2007). The highest level of a capability maturity model demonstrated the
pinnacle of the best practices model, corresponding to the fifth level of a capabilities maturity
model (Ahuja, 2009; Kayworth & Whitten, 2010; Luftman & Ben-Zvi, 2010; Xiao-yan, Yu-qing,
& Li-lei, 2011).
End user expectations of best practices could be summarized as protecting a customer’s
data confidentiality, ensuring accuracy of the data (Johnson, 2009). Implemented best practices
could be used to increase trust between partners and meet requirements levied by partners
(Johnson, 2009), in the case of the government, public trust. Costs must also be considered as
there was a tradeoff between being really secure and insecurely achieving BBP, yet avoiding
extravagant spending on security. Lastly, best practices met the overall strategic plan for
business objectives by providing short and long range returns on investment (Johnson, 2009).
2.4.6 Re-Organization
With the use of the excuse for organizational change as an argument, the re-organizer
operated under the premise that since security had been found deficient in the past, management
required a change in the reporting structure of the organization; hoping to stave off negative
reactions or placate audit findings, the organization re-organized (Cecere, 2011). Several areas
are stated as complicit with failure, amongst them was the strategy (Rose, 2011). A major
problem with using the information security strategy as a tool to drive organizational and
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structural change (Aivazian, 1998) was that management might try to use the information
security strategy as a vehicle to encourage organizational change (Aivazian, 1998; Kotulic &
Clark, 2004). Some offices in an organization may justify that they did not have enough workers
to meet inspection findings. A recommendation to re-assign people around the organization
helped to re-distribute and theoretically improve the information security strategy performance.
The organizational chart was the primary artifact used with the information security strategy to
communicate the structure and mission of the information security strategy (Norman & Yasin,
2010).
A positive use of re-organization, could be seen in things such as resource availability
and could be redistributed to ensure competent information security personnel, software and
hardware, and adequate information security budget was disbursed to appropriate parts of the
organization (Johnson, 2009). Another positive use might be that non-effective initial review by
management required a change to re-direct assets towards the goal of secure information
technology (Emery, 1991).
2.4.7 Power Relationships
Power could be exerted through the strategy, directing the way in which an organization
moved forward (Backhouse, Hsu, & Silva, 2006). Individuals used the information security
strategy to exercise will and or drive conformance by employees, as a way in which the
information security strategy could be wielded as an instrument of power within the organization
(Mintzberg, 1985; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977). Wielding power to achieve information security
goals was perceived to increase the stature of security overall. Using power to coerce individuals
and organizations might achieve a short term objective, but usually resulted in security being
ineffective over time (Backhouse, et al., 2006; Dhillon, 1995; Dhillon, 2004; Dhillon, Caldeira,
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& Wenger, 2011). Power and accountability could impact the development and implementation
of information security. The lack of an effective information security strategy, led to ineffective
security policy, which resulted in ineffective information security (Lapke, 2008; Loveland &
Lobel, 2012). Side effects from the use of power indicated that the use of power to negatively
influence personnel did not have the desired effect of causing someone to behave correctly.
Rather when positive reasoning was employed, users responded more positively (Herath & Rao,
2009).
2.4.8 Compliance
Compliance looked at using federal laws and regulations to center the entire information
security strategy around. Compliance was very procedurally oriented (da Veiga & Eloff, 2007).
People were not heavily involved with the process, except to perform procedures, and record
results within the process (Hedström, et al., 2011). One article stated that as a result of data
breaches, multiple acts and laws to ensure compliance were passed and enacted (Smedinghoff,
2005). Reactive implementation of controls is a precursor to complacency in that after the initial
flurry of activity to comply, the organization went back to business as usual, with security not at
the forefront (Damianides, 2005; Scully, 2011). Another article stated that technological
controls were fine, as long as people were not involved with the process (Hedström, et al., 2011).
If people, policies, and culture were involved the risk to security exists (Hu, Hart, & Cooke,
2007).
One of the positive aspects of compliance was that compliance helped to ensure risk
management, through minimizing risk that could occur from a data breach. Ensuring accurate
company data leads to informed management decisions (Hong, Chi, Chao, & Tang, 2003).

32

Compliance led to protection from external intruders, employee accidental or intentional
damage, and to deter potential attacks (Johnson, 2009).
2.4.9 Summary of Roles
The literature consisted of information that led to the identification of eight possible
categories of roles an information security professional could assume. This chapter captured and
discussed the possible roles that could be taken from extant literature. Exploration of the role
selection process and possible alignment inside an organization was part of a possible
information security strategy development process (von Solms, 2001). The next chapter
explored in detail the research method selected to rigorously collect data and analyze it to
theorize over role selection in accomplishing the mission of the information security program.
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Chapter 3
Research Method
3.1 Introduction
Of the different research methods available, quantitative, mixed methods, and qualitative,
this study will use a qualitative method. The reasoning behind non selection of the quantitative
method is the dearth of literature on information security strategy and measuring against known
models. The reason to not choose mixed methods is the need to have measurable entities, but
there are no established empirical norms for information security strategy. Selection of the
qualitative method centers on the fact that information was scarce on the subject of information
security strategy (Lapke, 2008; Loveland & Loebel, 2012). As such, the methods of research for
utilizing models and theories are minimal. Grounded theory data collection allows for the
analysis of data; using the interpretive techniques of interviews and artifact collection of data
(Allan, 2003; Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Much data was collected and conceptually analyzed to
understand organizational use of the role of information security strategy through a grounded
theory approach by using theoretical sampling techniques (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Javinen,
2000; Lee & Hubona, 2009; Pauleen, Corbitt, & Yoong, 2007; Ransbotham & Mitra, 2009;
Yoong, 1996). Extensive collection, analysis, and comparison of the data ensured rigor (Lee &
Hubona, 2009).
Grounded theory works inductively, by collection of artifacts and interviews, then
working through stages of coding to develop an emergent theory (Pandit, 1996). The steps begin
with interviews and transcription; coding of the interviews using open, axial, and selective
coding techniques; and then developing the theory (Allan, 2003; Jones & Alony, 2011; Glaser,
2012b; LaRossa, 2005; McFadzean, et al., 2007). At each step capturing thought, procedure, and
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process through memoing helped develop understanding and insights as the compilation of
collected data occurred and analysis was conducted (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 1990;
Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Pauleen, Corbitt, & Yoong, 2007; Rich, 2012).
Grounded theory is very useful in instances when the area under study, such as this, does not
have considerable research being performed and the nature of the study involved human
experience and interaction to obtain data (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Yoong, 1996). The objective
of the study investigated the connections between the information security strategy and the
role(s) necessary to execute the information security program in order to meet organizational
requirements for information security. It could also prove helpful to information security
professionals if the outputs from this grounded theory methodology resulted in constructing a
formal approach to information security strategy selection that goes beyond the implementation
of technical controls. Additionally, it could be beneficial to forming a proactive approach to
information security strategy, if a model could be predictive of role selection. The following
sections: open coding, axial coding, and selective coding present more detail over the rigor
practiced throughout the steps of the data collection process.
3.2 Research Method
The grounded theory methodology followed in this study allowed and encouraged
probing for information in how an information security professional was influenced to select
roles and make choices to perform their information security programs. The interview
questioning and exploration for data granted insight into how construction of an information
security strategy took place (Duffy, Ferguson, & Watson, 2004; Wimpenny & Gass, 2000).
Further, the analysis of the data led to an understanding whether certain types of strategy were
preferable over others and how strategies differed from one another as perceived by executive
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level members in an organization from business, information system, and information security
sections (Fitzgerald, 2010; Johnson, 2009). It also helped to ascertain how information security
personnel differentiated between types of information security strategies. Chapter 2 presented a
possible way in the process of selection of a role to perform information security strategy could
be made. Chapter 4 covers the process of selection to reveal if there is an optimum role for a
specific information security strategy. The aim of this study was to derive theory from analyzed,
collected data (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Siponen, 2005a; Vannoy & Salam, 2010), and present an
emergent theory (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Glaser, 2012a; Goldkuhl & Cronholm, 2010;
Pandit, 1996; Scott & Howell, 2008). The data was collected from the artifacts, interviews,
observations, and documents, and then coded and analyzed into a theory which was used to
verify the problem statement and research questions (Huehls, 2005; Lee & Hubona, 2009;
Wimpenny & Gass, 2000). The emergent concepts from the coding steps were grouped into
concepts and categories, and categories integrated to form a theory (Corbin & Strauss 2008;
Huehls, 2005). A theory then depicted adaptable ways of theorizing how an information security
professional selects a role (Fitzgerald, 2010; Siponen, 2005a).
As an initial foray into information security strategy using grounded theory, it was useful
to discover a process for qualified strategic role selection by an organization, which would have
a positive impact on organizational performance. The primary contribution was a theory
allowing an organization to evaluate its needs, select, and then possibly implement an
information security strategy. The first step in the process was gathering the data and the
following section illustrates how data was collected.
3.3 Proposed Data Collection
The data collection process consisted of multiple steps or stages in grounded theory
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methodology. Figure 1, Developing a Grounded Theory, highlights the steps required to arrive
at a theory from the collected data. To start, the researcher conducted interviews with
participants in the study. After the interviews were conducted, they were transcribed and
reviewed by the researcher, to ensure complete information was captured and transferred to print
medium (Duffy, et al., 2004; Wimpenny & Gass, 2000). During the process of transcription, the
researcher recorded memos, capturing the researcher’s impressions expressed by the participant,
for use in the coding process (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Stocker & Close, 2013).
Cycling between the interview and transcription forms the data collection portion of interviews.
Other sources for collection are the observations of the researcher in the environment wherein
the participant operated (Backman & Kyngaes, 1999; LaRossa, 2005). The researcher collected
document artifacts which ranged from strategy documents, standard operating procedures, and
internal letters covering mission goals and objectives (Lee & Hubona, 2009), which
complemented the data collected during the interviews with executives. The follow-on for the
interview was taking the information and coding it into usable data for building a theory
(Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008).
With grounded theory, there are very few guidelines to establish an optimum number of
subjects for interviews (Eisenhardt, 1989; McFadzean, et al., 2007; McFadzean, et al., 2011).
One source recommends a minimal sampling of fifteen to twenty subjects for grounded theory,
where prior data is almost nonexistent (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2011). Another
source recommends to almost double the amount for the recommended minimums, of 20 to 30
subjects (Creswell, 2002). Charmaz (2006), advanced that the researcher should query their
participants and add interviews until reaching saturation, which may be a small amount of
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Figure 1. Developing a Grounded Theory
individuals on up to approximately 30 different participants. Saturation occurs when, as a
researcher, one collects and comparatively analyzes data and a point is reached when no new
categories or areas are discovered from discussions with CISOs or gleaning data from
documents. The estimation being that once saturation is reached, the need for more interviews
no longer exists (Charmaz, 2006). The researcher for this study queried twenty five participants
from one large government organization, and expanded this to several within the Federal
government, interviewing seven other chief information security officers (CISOs) in order to
reach saturation of the categories.
The researcher reached out to the organizations and queried executive level participants
to take part in interviews, asked for copies of documents pertaining to their strategy and their
mission goal accomplishments, and obtained permission to observe day to day operations for a
time within their organization (Backman & Kyngaes, 1999; LaRossa, 2005). This study did not
conflict with the researcher’s professional duties and complete anonymity of position and
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location was practiced with the organizations. Initial interviews with 13 CISOs and their
deputies, for a total of 25 from the 13 sub units of the large organization comprised the main
participants in the study. An additional seven CISOs and or deputies were approached from
other large organizations in order to reach saturation (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008).
This involved four additional organizations to reach an adequate level of saturation (Charmaz,
2006).
The chief information security officers (CISOs) from the information security sub units
were the primary interviewees for the grounded theory study. Johnson (2009) asserted that the
best mix of data comes from executives of equal rank and from peer levels in the organization.
This allowed for viewpoints from similar background levels on information security from CISOs
in the overall organization, but also from differing sub units (Johnson, 2009). And, it granted the
review of the roles they deemed necessary to meet organizational sub unit information security
requirements. What one level of the organization deemed necessary does not always equate to
what the other organizations deemed necessary (Chen, et al., 2010). Each organization had
differing mission requirements. The interviews gained key enabler data from top level
management insights “(b)y exploring what managers were thinking, why they acted as they did,
and what they wanted to accomplish within the organizational context,” (Vannoy & Salam,
2010) for the subject of strategy and strategic roles.
In order to gauge the length of time required at each site in the use of grounded theory,
the researcher reviewed the number, location, and parts of the large governmental organization
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Glaser, 2002). The main organization covered here was dubbed the
‘Branch of the Fatherland’ which consisted of 13 smaller subunits performing differing portions
of the mission of the overall large organization. Of these 13 smaller sub units, a number of
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CISOs and their deputies were selected and interviewed, observed, and documented. A brief,
sanitized unit organizational mission statement, collected from each of the unit sources yielded
information about its number, location(s) and composition (Pitt, Parent, Junglas, Chan, &
Spyropoulou, 2011), except for one sub unit who did not want information captured. Refer to
Table 4, Participant Sub Unit Characteristics, for a brief explanation of each sub unit.
The most complex portion of the data collection was the actual interview of participants. There
are several types of interview styles to choose from such as semi-structured, structured, and open
ended interviews (Allan, 2003; Duffy, et al., 2004; Wimpenny & Gass, 2000). The narrowness
of the information required and the small area of the overall information security program
recommended the semi-structured form of interviewing as the most effective (Charmaz, 2006,
Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Duffy, et. al., 2004). The reason being that open ended interviews may
end up gathering volumes of extraneous data, not pertinent to the study and structured interviews
may tend to be overly biased (Duffy, et al., 2004; Wimpenny & Gass, 2000). Therefore, the use
of semi-structured interviews was selected.
The researcher asked executive level personnel, in the information security field, from the
sub units of a large government organization to take part. The participants agreed to answering
questions and were assured of confidentiality and anonymity in their responses. In order to have
consistent interviews with all the participants, the researcher agreed to and observed the ground
rules for the interview utilizing an approved Institutional Review Board (IRB) consent form to
give the participant a frame of reference and keep the interactions of the interview within a
bounded area (Allan, 2003; Corbin & Strauss, 2008).
For each interview, the researcher wrote down notes from all the answers to the
questions, jotting down details as they occurred. Outlines of the discussion provided the skeleton
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Table 4. Participant Sub Unit Characteristics
Name*

AXXX

Size
(Information
Security
Personnel)
22

UHJY

210

FRT

0**

UKO

135

ERF

171

CFTY

240

GHY

5

GHJK

14

ERFT

177

WFRT

102

WER

39

NKOP

181

WDC

21

Mission Statement

Watches over Fatherland’s banking and payment
systems to ensure integrity. Also protects national
leaders, dignitaries, special locations, and Fatherland
events.
Helps the public by responding, recovering, and
remediating from all hazards. Helps the Fatherland to be
prepared for any emergencies.
Watches over the Fatherland’s transportation systems to
make sure citizens and commerce can move freely.
Enforces Fatherland’s civil and national laws for the
border, customs, trade, and immigration.
Primarily keeps invaders and supplies for invader
groups out from the Fatherland. Ensures trade conducted
fairly and all bureaucratic rules are obeyed.
Patrols the Fatherland’s coastal edges against unlawful
entry and assists people who may be in danger along the
coast.
Independently validates subunits for optimum
performance, by identifying areas of improvement and
ways to attain compliance.
Facilitates training for law enforcement to assist them
with skills development for public safety.
Ensures immigration procedures followed and teaches
principles and benefits of Fatherland are communicated
to all citizens.
Helps to ensure risk resilience throughout Fatherland in
government and industry, by an integrated method for
both cyber and physical threats.
Performs research and development for all levels of
government used to find emerging technology to
support and protect the Fatherland.
Responsible for Fatherland’s information technology
systems and equipment, and the identification and
tracking of performance measurements.
Responsible for protecting information and intelligence
from being exploited.

*NOTE: Specific names and some aspects of their function changed to avoid disclosure.
**NOTE: At the time of collection, FRT deemed it essential not to reveal full complement of
information security personnel figures.
of the interview notes and assisted the researcher in analyses made. Most executives enjoyed
having their thoughts taken down and preserved in reports, documents, and in this instance for
the interviews (Johnson, 2009). Ample time was set aside during the interview to allow the
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participants to form their thought, considering their perceived factors with the information
security strategy provided to them by management in the organization and to express their
driving compassion for information security (Charmaz, 2006). Notes were transcribed as soon as
possible after the interview was conducted (Duffy, et al., 2004; Wimpenny & Gass, 2000) via
memoing. The researcher also wrote down an initial interpretation immediately afterwards
(Stocker & Close, 2013). While every effort was made to collect exhaustive data during the
initial session, the option was kept open to conduct multiple sessions with all the participants at a
future point in time, if necessary (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008).
Several direct and indirect questions were asked of the interviewees to lead discussion
during the interview. In this way through open ended questions in a semi structured interview, it
elicited information from the executives operating in the actual information security
environment, as they supported the business, information systems, and information security
missions (Allan, 2003; Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Duffy, et al., 2004). The
researcher planned out the questions as probing, but not aimed at any pre-selection of roles,
alignments, or construction of a strategy. The source for interview questions came from
knowledge gained and based on the literature available and reviewed in Chapter 2. The
questions focused on discovering how the interviewee developed their role within the
organization where they were assigned. Also, the discussion sought to have the interviewee
explore their reasoning for picking particular roles. Table 5, Interview Question Rationale, listed
the questions used, the source for the question, and the rationale for their formation of a response
during the interview. The nature of theoretical sampling allowed and encouraged participants to
be free in their response and to follow no set path in revealing data about their understanding of
the complexities of the formation of information security strategy in government organizations
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and what the differing roles individuals used to perform information security applied to their unit
in the organization (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). The researcher did ask clarifying questions to
elicit further open ended responses from the participants. During the process of data collection,
the researcher avoided reaching conclusions with participants (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Corbin &
Strauss, 2008). The epoche or the conscious decision centered on objectivity was to remove any
preconceived notions during an interview (Allan, 2003; Kwok, McCallin, & Dickson, 2012).
Keeping distance from the data sources helped to prevent developing a theory closely tied to the
data that might otherwise look more like a quantitative observation with empirical data (Corbin
& Strauss, 2008; Eisenhardt, 1989) than an impartial collection of the data evaluated using the
grounded theory approach. No preconceived agendas guided collection in response to the
research questions or the research problem (Allan, 2003). Accomplishing interviews in this
fashion brought rigor to the collection process and ensured bias avoidance from introduction by
the researcher (Allan, 2003; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Kwok, et al., 2012).
Theoretical sampling allowed the researcher to obtain practitioner data directly from the
professionals closest to the process, obtaining firsthand information more applicable to
addressing the research problem. Utilizing constructivist grounded theory techniques (Allen,
2010; Charmaz, 2006; Devadas, Silong, & Ismail, 2011; Glaser, 2012a; Rich, 2012), the
researcher crafted questions to elicit a story and a history of the participant without feeling under
pressure to perform (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Wimpenny,& Gass, 2000). The
participant felt more comfortable in answering honestly. Once participants yielded data in the
interview, concepts were then derived (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Huehls, 2005).
Theoretical sampling also enabled the researcher to discover practitioner concepts relevant to the
problem and the population, because of the unexplored organizational areas of the information
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Table 5. Interview Question Rationale
Question
In your opinion, what
is information
security strategy?
What does security
strategy mean to you?
And to this
organization?
What is the role you
take to accomplish
information security
strategy?
Can you elaborate on
how you arrive with
your strategic
priorities for
information security?
Can you describe the
model (framework or
system) of your
information security
strategy?

Sources
Baskerville &
Dhillon, 2008;
White & Bruton,
2011
Hall, Sarkoni, &
Mazzuchi, 2010

Johnson, 2009;
Johnson &
Lederer, 2010
Mintzberg &
Waters, 1985

Mintzberg &
Waters, 1985

Can you describe how McFadzean, et
the implementation of al., 2007;
information security
Johnson, 2009
strategy is tracked?
Thinking of security
strategy, how do you
manage the priorities
of the large
organization?
Can you explain what
capabilities are
necessary for a
successful
information security
strategy?

Gavetti &
Rivkin, 2005

McFadzean, et
al., 2007;
McFadzean, et
al., 2011

Rationale
Find out and elicit from the participant the level of
understanding they have of the subject of strategy
and especially information security strategy.
More opinion based, to ascertain the information
the participant operates with in the performance of
their job and how they see themselves supporting
the business mission through strategy.
Trying to get the participant to evaluate their
perceived role of operation within the
organization. The most direct question to
ascertain their perception of roles.
Attempting to gain insight into their selection
process and how they operate with their
leadership’s direction for strategic development.
The participant evaluates their activities and
matches them to the priorities they need to
achieve for success.
An attempt to gain from the participant the
viewpoint they have of the information security
strategy and where it fits in the information
system and organizational strategy. The
participant plays a role in meeting outside
objectives.
A question to try and find out if they have metrics
established and how they measure success in
completion of goals and objectives in an
organized plan. Assuming a role, the participant
tracks success and keeps track of it.
Does the participant track and use the strategy as a
tool or does the plan not work correctly as written.
This also illustrates the role the participant takes
to be able to accomplish the priorities.
To try and ascertain what the participant views as
being successful with an information security
strategy. How they approach the strategy and
what role they may assume to make it successful.

Note: Some sources are from business and information systems strategy research, as the guiding principles apply
also to information security strategy.

security program that became important to this study (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008;
Creswell, 2002; Jirasek, 2012; Mcfadzean, et al., 2007).
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Data collection led to analysis. Analysis led to concepts. Concepts generated questions.
Questions led to more data collection. As analysis ensued, it kept revealing concepts and if
questions persisted, the researcher made arrangements to gain further clarification from the
participants (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Huehls, 2005). The cycle of more collection continued
until all possible data collection and coding for new concepts yielded no new concepts from the
analysis. Continuous data collection happened with participants until reaching saturation.
Saturation occurs until the point, “when no new categories or relevant themes are emerging,”
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008). At that point, data collection was completed. In the following data
analysis section, the process for performing open, axial, and selective coding is covered to
construct categories on multiple levels and develop the theory from the data (Allan, 2003;
Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss 2008; Jones & Alony, 2011; LaRossa, 2005; McFadzean, et
al., 2007).
3.4 Proposed Data Analysis
Data analysis was where coding took place. Grounded theory uses the comparative
method of data analysis, analyzing elements of the data within and from one source to another
(Allan, 2003; Jones & Alony, 2011, Rich, 2012). The process starts with collecting data from
individual interviews and artifacts and then constantly comparing and contrasting data between
collected interviews and artifacts. The outcomes of these comparisons should identify
categories and the core category through this coding process identified in Figure 1, Developing a
Grounded Theory (Allan, 2003; Backman & Kyngaes, 1999; Hallberg, 2006; LaRossa, 2005;
Vannoy & Salam, 2010). The coding process consisted of three separate, yet interrelated steps in
data analysis. Figure 1, depicts the first step as open coding which builds multiple categories and
as a result of analysis in the open coding step a central or core category began to emerge
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(Hallberg, 2006). The second step, axial coding, establishes connections between categories that
are identified and built into the structure of the analysis. The third step, selective coding,
developed the outputs of axial coding and weaves them together to build the narrative of the
analysis (Allan, 2003; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Jones & Alony, 2011; Siponen, 2005a).
Overall, comparative analysis was inductive and led to building a theory from the data
(Allan, 2003; Devades, Silong, & Ismail, 2011; Rowlands, 2005). To assuage the notion of
skepticism over the use of grounded theory, strict methods were followed that granted
repeatability, should someone desire to take the information collected and attempt to re-create
the same categories or arrive with the same theory. Opening the sources and identifying this
method adds rigor to ensure obtaining similar results. The researcher also used two tools adapted
from other grounded theory exemplars, called the conditional relationship guide and reflective
coding matrix (Scott & Howell, 2008). The conditional relationship guide introduced a step by
step procedure to obtain and verify the dissection of collected data into high level categories.
The reflective coding matrix adds rigor by the way in which it aids the researcher to collect and
comparatively analyze similarities together during axial and selective coding, assisting with
identifying the properties of what will become the emergent theory (Scott & Howell, 2008).
The first step of the open coding process worked to identify the concepts, categories and
properties, captured in interviews, memos and code notes. During open coding, analysis can be
as granular as analyzing word for word, a line at a time, two to three sentences or whole
paragraphs to surmise meaning into categories (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; LaRossa, 2005; Vannoy
& Salam, 2010). Open coding gathered the data, built the background, and focused on the words
chosen and used. Open coding also looked at how comparisons were made with the discovered
categories and how similar categories were placed into groupings (Allan, 2003; LaRossa, 2005;
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McFadzean, et al., 2007). The conditional relationship guide is a simple matrix that assists with
establishing and capturing initial categories for use in open coding. The matrix assisted by
expanding researcher experience and interpretive creativity through asking several questions of
the data to allow the development of categories (Scott & Howell, 2008). The consistent use of
the questions to establish categories added to the rigor in the treatment of data and ensured
identification of all possible categories. Scott and Howell (2008) suggested the use of the matrix
to add rigor as it established an audit trail in how categories were developed, using the interview
questions. After grouping together terms into categories, the next step built the linkages or
connections between the categories.
Axial coding sought to find the relationships or links between categories. Axial coding
analysis considered interconnections of categories and if terms or phrases should be moved
around or placed in different categories. During the second step, the areas of interest were built
through the connecting of narratives together. Axial coding looked for causal conditions and if
any intervening connections occurred between the categories, for building of stories amongst the
categories (LaRossa, 2005; McFadzean, et al., 2007; Vannoy & Salam, 2010). The primary
purpose of the reflective coding matrix was to develop the core category and contextualize it
with all the other minor categories identified from the collected data (Hallberg, 2006; Strauss &
Corbin, 1998). Scott and Howell (2008) observed that the reflective coding matrix helped to
build the categories into an evolving storyline, refining the order and sequence of categories.
The researcher used the reflective coding matrix to flow from left to right, moving categories
around and kept the story flowing from start to finish, which all centered around the core
category or central phenomenon (Brown, Stevens, Troiano, & Schneider, 2002; Hallberg, 2006).
The end result of using both the conditional relationship guide and the reflective coding matrix
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led to the theory development and emergence from the data (Brown, et al., 2002). The reflective
coding matrix feeds selective coding.
Selective coding was the combining together of all the plots into a more coherent
outcome from all the analysis of information. The story behind all the data collected during
interviews and from artifacts retrieved and analyzed from files (Jones & Alony, 2011; LaRossa,
2005; McFadzean, et al., 2007; Vannoy & Salam, 2010). This third step, selective coding, was
where the data analysis of threading the categories into the core category together to define how
things resolved into an emergent theory (Hallberg, 2006). The last part of the selective coding
step revealed the relationships amongst the data to show the theory from the collected data
(Backman & Kyngaes, 1999; Devadas, Silong, & Ismail, 2011; Siponen, 2005b). With the
successful coding of data, the results of open, axial, and selective coding are reviewed in detail in
Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4
Data Collection, Analysis, and Findings
4.1 Introduction
Outcomes for this study developed as the collection, analysis, and results stages
progressed. The researcher interviewed participants, dissected the inputs of the interviews and
correlated the results into a theory on the roles individuals used for an information security
strategy. The following sections elucidate the steps taken and tied them together to produce a
theory to advance the information security program through the analysis of information security
strategy.
4.2 Data Collection
Using the procedure for conducting interviews as prescribed in Chapter 3, the researcher
conducted interviews with 32 chief information security officers (CISOs) and their deputies
(DCISOs). Primarily, 25 interviews were conducted from units within one large government
organization. An additional seven interviews were conducted with CISOs and DCISOs from like
or sister units within other large government organizations. Table 6, Sister Unit Characteristics,
identifies the sister or similar organizations and how they would equate to CISOs and DCISOs
from the large ‘Fatherland’ organization (Table 4, Participant Sub Unit Characteristics). Table 6
contains a short sanitized mission statement of the sister units and then a cross reference to Table
4 to illustrate where the units are similar. The seven interviews served two purposes. Primarily,
to reach saturation in the collection of data, but also to test and observe whether like or sister
organizations responded with the same kinds of responses. The seven respondents did answer
the questions in a very similar manner. Table 7, Interviewee Index, captured a breakdown of all
of the study participants. It shows the respondent identifier to the unit type and whether the
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organization was small or large; also, whether the participant was from sister organizations or
not. Small organizations are sub parts of a large organization.
Each interview was carried out per the arrangements identified within the Institutional
Review Board (IRB) approved agreement. The researcher met with each individual at a local
coffee shop, meeting room, or an agreed upon CISO designated meeting location. The
interviewer reviewed the entire IRB agreement paragraph by paragraph with each interviewee
Table 6. Sister Unit Characteristics
Sister Unit
Name from Table 4,
Name
Participant Sub Unit
Characteristics
UHJY
LLA
MSD

FRT

BAUD*

ERF

VTEB

WER

POKE

NKOP

ABC

WDC

Mission Statement

Helps the public by responding, recovering, and
remediating from all chemical and bio hazards. Helps
the country to be prepared for those emergencies.
Watches over the country’s high energy systems to
make sure citizens of the country are safe.
Primarily keeps terrorists and supplies for terrorist
groups out from the country. Ensures order and
civility in the country and all bureaucratic rules are
obeyed.
Performs research and development for all levels of
government used to find emerging drugs to support
and protect the country.
Responsible for country’s information technology
systems and equipment, and the identification and
tracking of performance measurements.
Responsible for protecting information and intelligence
from being exploited in the country.

*NOTE: The agency BAUD had two participants from the same organization
and obtained a commitment to be available for follow-on questioning, if necessary. The
interviewer asked the same set of questions, in the same way, from each individual to ensure
appropriate rigor (Allan, 2003; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Lee & Hubona, 2009). The interviewer
wrote the text of the responses verbatim and took observational notes during each session.
Immediately afterwards, the interviewer transcribed the notes into a capture of the interview.
The interviewer also kept a journal of interviewees after conducting the interview of each
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participant. Each respondent was assigned an arbitrary, random alpha numeric designator, as
noted in Table 7, Interviewee Index, and the resultant transcript of the interviews were used in
the coding analysis.
Table 7. Interviewee Index

The researcher conducted the interviews over a six month period of time. The bulk of the
interviews took place within the first three months (December 2013 to February 2014), as the
availability of CISOs was optimal. For the second three months (March to May 2014), schedules
and availability of CISOs prevented a few interviews from taking place as planned. Inclement
weather did play a role with two interview attempts and obtaining those interviews stretched over
two months before resolving schedule conflicts and the actual interview taking place. The
researcher persisted in obtaining interviews and reached saturation before the thirty second
interview. It would not be possible to say exactly when saturation was reached, because of the
comparative analysis process occurred alongside conducting interviews. As stated in Chapter 3,
the point of saturation was reached when no new data for categories surfaced during the
interviews of CISOs.
It should be noted, that during the entire interview process two invited CISOs were not
able to participate. One CISO had intervening reasons for not conducting an interview, by
continually stating information security issues and other meetings took priority over an
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interview. A second CISO, who initially agreed to be interviewed, had been extremely difficult
to contact and has been traveling constantly around the United States since their arrival. After
May 2014, the point of saturation was reached. Two additional new CISOs have been hired into
units within the large organization, but lack expertise in the field and in the large ‘Fatherland’
organization precluded the need to interview the CISOs. In the end, saturation was reached
through the 32 contacted and participated CISOs and no further interviews have been deemed
necessary. However should the opportunity arise, the researcher does remain open and
invitations have been extended to CISOs who would still like to participate.
4.3 Data Analysis
The researcher began the analysis of data by taking the whole interviews of the
participants and summarized them individually into a high level analysis overview. The initial
results captured in Table 8, Overall Initial Analysis, illustrated where each CISO stood in the
general areas under the study. The initial analysis considered four specific areas of interest.
Proactive versus reactive approach; whether they have a written strategy or not, who they aligned
with, and what their perceived role might be. All this information was captured in the individual
highlighted sections of Table 8, Overall Initial Analysis. The first area was whether the CISO
viewed their information security program as operating with a reactive, proactive, or a
combination of both a reactive or proactive approach towards their information security program.
One specific instance can be related, according to Respondent M7 (personal communication,
April 14, 2014) who stated, “it (information security strategy) needs to clearly articulate the risk
of a decision by management that would put data at risk and it must be proactive and not reactive
in decisions.” The second area asked was whether the CISO had an information security strategy
of some sort, did not have one, or stated that one was not necessary. One indicative example of
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Respondent
A0
B3
B8
C7
D2
E3
F5
G7
H8
I5
J7
K2
K5
L9
M2
M7
N5
O9
P4
P5
Q3
R2
S1
T5
T8
U2
V8
W3
X4
X9
Y4
Z7

X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X

X
X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X

Compliance
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X

X
X
X

X

Power Relationship

X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X

Re-Organization

X

X

X
X
X
X

Best Practice
X

X
X
X
X

Continual Change

Competitor

Public Image

Top Down

Ad-hoc

On its own

IT

X

X
X

Bus/IT

Business

Not Needed

X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X

Don't have one

Have one

Reactive

Proactive

Strategy

Table 8. Overall Initial Analysis

X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X
X
X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X
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an isolated case came from Respondent F5 (personal communication, December 30, 2013) who
said, “What we do, is we have developed, rather we have the CIO strategic plan.” As a
qualitative measurement, most of the CISOs either had a written strategy, one was in the process
of approval, or they used a higher level organizational strategy, such as the information systems
strategy or the business strategy. The CISOs who stated it as not being necessary relied upon
having the information systems strategy from the Chief Information Officer (CIO) as their
prescriptive strategy. The third area looked at the way in which the CISO aligned their activities
in the information security program towards one that used the goals of the business, business and
information systems, information systems, information security operating on its own or using adhoc (no goals in their leadership) working issues as they were confronted. One example of a
business driven strategy came from Respondent M2 (personal communication, January 8, 2014)
who said, “My role is to act as a conduit to political appointees. I deal with political appointees
and the overarching drivers of the organization.” In the fourth section of the spreadsheet, an
initial assessment was made in how the CISOs viewed and or operated in a role for the
performance of their duties. Some stated they operated in one particular role and some CISOs
displayed performance of multiple roles to meet their assessed information security program
goals (Carter, Grover, & Bennett Thatcher, 2011; Weill & Woerner, 2013). The roles identified
from the participants consisted of top down, public image, competitor, continual change, best
practice, and compliance very similar to the categories identified in Chapter 2.
A closer look at the overall analysis revealed that for the most part CISOs viewed
themselves as reactive in response to leadership. Most CISOs do not have an established
information security strategy. The overwhelming majority worked with business and
information systems sections of the organization. They decried the lack of security, but
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conformed to either the CIO or business leadership. Lastly, most CISOs performed primarily in
a compliance mode of operations. The main reason surfacing in most interviews was the fact
that by Federal law the CISOs must comply with the Clinger Cohen Act of 2002, under the
section known as the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) 2002 (Burwell,
2013; Corbet, 2014). The initial overall analysis highlighted individual overviews of what
individual CISOs viewed for their information security programs. The actual analysis in this
study used coding to bring all the inputs from all of the respondents and weave them all into an
overall review. Using the agreed upon approach in Chapter 3, the researcher began coding data
from the transcribed interviews. The researcher proceeded into the coding process to perform
the open, axial, and selective coding of the collected data.
4.3.1 Open Coding
The interviewer transcribed the sentence by sentence breakdown of the interviews
conducted with CISO executives. There was no paraphrasing or summarization of thought in the
transcriptions of the interviews. The researcher utilized an open coding process to review all the
sentences collected from interviews with 32 CISO executives. As an example of the rigor
performed, on the interview can be illustrated in taking one particular portion, at random and
following through open coding. The portion selected were parts of Respondent Y4 in the first
steps of the comparative analysis inside of the open coding process leading to categorization of
the interview. In particular, Respondent Y4, Question 6 is used for this analysis. The interview
question (Table 5, Interview Question Rationale) was, “Can you describe how the
implementation of information security strategy is tracked?” and the response from Respondent
Y4 was:
Implementation is tracked through a number of ways in our program. First it is
measured through compliance activities taking a given standard and incorporating
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these policies and standards into a checklist of activities of which all team
members affiliated with these actions and tasks are responsible for. Another way
is through management activities in understanding the day to day mission and the
approvals that must accompany certain activities and an effective communication
process which allows managers to remain insightful about the activities of their
stuff. Another way of tracking it is through mandatory reporting or inspections by
the organization office of the inspector general. I believe that all of these methods
allows for us to successfully gauge the effectiveness of the program and provides
key indicators as to the effectiveness of the implementation strategy. Lastly,
customer feedback cannot be overlooked in assessing the implementation of the
program.
The researcher used a manual form to take the captured sentences of Question 6 from
Respondent Y4, dividing them up into a sentence for each cell in Table 9, Question 6,
Respondent Y4. The left hand column states the respondent’s sentence and then next to it in the
adjacent right hand column, the initial first pass of comparative analysis towards categorization
Table 9. Question 6, Respondent Y4
Response Broken into Sentences
Implementation is tracked through a number of ways
in our program.
First it is measured through compliance activities
taking a given standard and incorporating these
policies and standards into a checklist of activities of
which all team members affiliated with these actions
and tasks are responsible for.
Another way is through management activities in
understanding the day to day mission and the
approvals that must accompany certain activities and
an effective communication process which allows
managers to remain insightful about the activities of
their staff.
Another way of tracking it is through mandatory
reporting or inspections by the organization office of
the inspector general.
I believe that all of these methods allows for us to
successfully gauge the effectiveness of the program
and provides key indicators as to the effectiveness of
the implementation strategy.
Lastly, customer feedback cannot be overlooked in
assessing the implementation of the program.

Analysis of the sentence
Number of ways of tracking

Compliance through checklists is one

Business understands mission approves staff
working in locations

Auditing of systems to IG

Strategy is realized through use of compliance
auditing and approvals
Customers are key in working

by open coding techniques. The side by side analysis in the open coding form captured the
transcript of CISOs on the left hand side and open coding review for categorization on the right
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hand side. The reviews were produced as short evaluation statements, used for identifying
categories. This step became the background to the comparative analysis, conducted within the
open coding step in an ongoing basis (Corbin & Strauss 2008; Charmaz, 2006).
The ‘in vivo’ summation in the right hand column attempted to keep the respondent’s
own words as much as possible for the category comparative analysis. The researcher performed
the side by side analysis of 1,783 sentences from the 32 interviews conducted. After the first few
interviews conducted, the interviewer surmised that the interview questions being asked
accomplished exactly what was desired. The responses gained from the interviewees produced
thoughtful exchanges between the interviewer and the CISO executives based upon the intended
areas as identified in Chapter 3, Table 5, Interview Question Rationale.
The researcher took the information resulting from the analysis of the sentence in the
initial open coding comparative analysis and grouped like sentences together. To illustrate how
a collected respondent’s responses fit into the overall collected candidate’s grouping, the
researcher depicted it as in Table 10, Comparative Analysis Groupings. The table consisted of a
column, on the left, identifying the individual Respondent Y4, Question 6, analysis of the
sentence, from Table 9, Question 6, Respondent Y4. These entries were added to the other
sentences from subsequent interviews into the middle column, which showed the current total of
collected candidates for a proposed category from all interviews conducted to that point in the
process of data collection. The sentences represented the ‘in vivo’ responses from the aggregate
respondents and collected these like responses together to yield the number of times a response
occurred. The third column was the in process count of the number of times a like response was
received up to the point in time. The number merely represented whether a candidate for a

57

category was substantial by the number of occurrences or if it only had a few occurrences
throughout the collection of data from interviews. This constant comparing cycle continued as
Table 10. Comparative Analysis Groupings
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interviews were conducted and from the previously analyzed interviews of CISOs. The entire
category candidates started out from the combined total of 1,783 analysis of sentences created
during the interview process and reduced the number until the open coding cycle was completed.
In this discussion, the researcher continued to use one comparatively analyzed sentence
from Respondent Y4, Question 6, analysis of a sentence (‘number of ways of tracking’),
response and folded this into the grouping called ensures compliance as represented in Table 11,
Raw Sentence to Short Category.
Table 11. Raw Sentence to Short Category

Once the number of groupings reached a manageable number of possible categories, 35
groupings, that resulted from the process. Table 12, Proposed Category Grouping, showed the
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results of comparative analysis, taking the sentences from all 32 CISOs and grouping like
responses into groups that represented the data collected. The single group in the table showed
Table 12. Proposed Category Grouping
Category

Grouping

Aligns Business

CISO aligns ISS to business goals. Often business sets goals for CISO

Aligns Business and IS

CISO aligns with both business and IT goals

Aligns IS

CIO often dictates for CISO to align

On its own

Some CISOs have own budget and set goals themselves

Ad Hoc

CISOs have no guidance and mostly work on putting fires out, Use project plans as strategy

Top Down

Management driven

Public Image

Business did not support security, public image worth more, No support from Business

Competitor
Continual Change

Seeking to outdo everyone in the large organization, Competitiveness
Change is imminent and needing to be protected, Flexible, Adaptable, Agile

Best Practice

CISO looked to other examples in order to build their ISS for the best possible results; a lot
of CISOs build once and use many times, mindset across government

Re-Organization

(While advanced, not much information obtained)

Auditing

Some performed audits to verify compliance

Measurement and metrics

Many measured results

Ensures Compliance

Majority tended to compliance as it is the law

InfoSec Prg
Priorities

Recognition of an overall program as needed
Prioritizing what matters in their program and according to whom it is a priority for

Visionary

Recognized the need to see a goal and have a vision for each goal

Framework model method

Looked to have a model to use for reaching a goal

Structure of an ISS

The actual process of developing a strategy (3 or 4 goals, max)

Putting the Strategy to work

Once devised, the strategy must work

Shelfware

Must be used or reverts to D2D or tactical

Trust

Customers must be able to trust CISO

'Know' Security

Recognized security as primary first step in process

Protect
Communications &
Collaboration

Protection of data and information systems

Buy-in

Recognition that buy-in from leadership (business/IT) is fundamental to the program

Automation

Speed of change requires automation or succumb to threats

Operations & Risk

Some recognized InfoSec and ISS is more than compliance and should fit to operations

Paradigm
threat driven, proactive,
change

Showed the shift from operations to threat

Talking and getting message across is crucial to success

While pursuing a standard CISO pursued next generation or preventing threat as opposed to
chasing after and patching

Tools

Can't do the job if you don't have the resources-People, re-organization as it applies to
having enough people
Can't do the job if you don't have the resources-Tools

Training

Can't do the job if you don't have the resources-Training

Budget

Can't do the job if you don't have the resources-Budget

Qualified Staff
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one category proposal. The number of major groupings or category candidates from the entire
study whittled down to 35 total candidates. Then a tool could be used to test the candidates for
validity. Scott and Howell (2008) advanced two tools for use by grounded theory researchers to
use in testing candidates for categories. The first tool, the conditional relationship guide (CRG)
would be utilized to test groupings by answering a series of questions to establish category
viability.
The final step of the open coding review utilized the conditional relationship guide (Scott
& Howell, 2004). For each candidate category, the information was extracted from the grouping
and entered into the CRG, which was designed to answer questions about the what, when, where,
why, how, and to what consequence the resulting category would have on the emergent theory
yet to be realized (Scott & Howell, 2008). Table 13, Conditional Relationship Guide, illustrates
one category, ensures compliance, through the answering of the questions. For the discussion,
the researcher utilized this grounded theory tool, during open coding analysis that would assist in
testing candidates for validity as categories.
4.3.2 Open Coding Results
As each proposed category was systematically tested with the CRG, the reviewer used the
questioning techniques to populate a conditional relationship guide (Scott & Howell, 2008) for
each proposed category. Each cycle produced a varying amount of responses. After several
passes of evaluation by comparative analysis, an additional six groupings were combined into
other groupings and it reduced the overall unique category list to 29 distinct categories. The two
columns of Table 12, Proposed Category Grouping, listed the tested categories of the CRG tool.
Taking the categories to the next step, axial coding, the researcher sought to deduce the core
category or central phenomenon of the study (Brown, et al., 2002; Hallberg, 2006).
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Table 13. Conditional Relationship Guide
Conditional Relationship Guide
Category
Ensures
Compliance
(Category
sentenceCompliance
provides a
score of
security,
good or bad,
that the
CISO tracks
according to
law)

What
ISS needs
to cover
compliance
.
Complianc
e consists
of
checklists.
Complianc
e measured
through
checklist
completion.

When
When
systems are
installed,
compliance
is a
requirement
for
operation.
Baseline
used by
scanners to
check
compliance
on all assets.
Checklists
formed
major
portion of
compliance
to ensure
standardizati
on of
checking.

Where
Compliance
checked on
every device,
system, and
asset
connected to
the network
Checklists
established
the standard
for each
device to be
verified with.
Scanning of
assets also
verified the
completeness
of
configuring
to the
standard.

Why
Without
standardization,
organizational
elements may
be able to
install assets
with differing
configurations.
Standardization
would also
prevent
different
versions from
being installed,
especially those
with
deficiencies or
vulnerabilities.

How
Implement
checklists to
ensure
compliance.
Review and
update
checklists to
ensure
completenes
s, especially
after an
update or
vulnerability
patching.

Consequence
Without
checklists,
standardizatio
n or
compliance
would be
harder to
ensure.
Without
scanning for
vulnerabilitie
s it would be
hard to
identify
weaknesses.

4.3.3 Axial Coding
In the second step of the grounded theory coding process, axial coding, the researcher
proceeded to further refine the initial grouping of categories and surmise the central or core
phenomenon. The researcher used constant comparison in coding and each time the researcher
made a pass on the collected data it reduced or combined categories and brought similarities
together into combined larger groupings. For example, the researcher looked at the possibility of
roles an information security professional could perform and found from the data that they could
be grouped into several distinct role groupings. There were several distinct types stated by
respondents as captured in Table 14, Role Groupings to Categories.
Bringing all the different types of roles into one large grouping resulted in a combination
grouping or mapping to one large category called roles. The combinations can then be called a
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higher level or super category, one the researcher labeled as roles. The process of further
combining through comparative analysis of the categories ended with the result of four super
group categories emerging from the data. The labels of those super groupings could be
characterized as roles, alignments, complexities, and resources that emerged from the data. This
began the start of analysis of each of the groups to be considered for the core category or central
phenomenon (Brown, et al., 2002; Hallberg, 2006). The researcher objectively evaluated each of
the super categories for consideration as the core category.
Table 14. Role Groupings to Categories
Role Proposal
Management driven
Business did not support security, public
image worth more, No support from
Business
Seeking to outdo everyone in the large
organization, Competitiveness
Change is imminent and needing to be
protected, Flexible, Adaptable, Agile
CISO looked to other examples in order
to build their ISS for the best possible
results; a lot of CISOs build once and
use many times, mindset across
government
(While advanced, it was not utilized)

Category Nomination
Top Down
Public Image

Competitor
Continual Change
Best Practice

Re-Organization

Expanding the titles of the candidates for the four super categories were the roles CISOs
chose, alignments of information security strategies, the complex structure of information
security strategies, and the resources for performing information security strategy. Since the
researcher can not totally ignore the fact that a literature review was conducted, the researcher
had to acknowledge the fact that many similarities existed in the roles and alignments.
Recognizing this, the researcher consciously let only the collected data drive the construction of
categories. The first two proposed super categories seemingly echoed the results of the literature
review in Chapter 2, in that there were several roles information security professionals adopted
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to implement their information security programs in the large government organization through
the information security strategy (Carter, Grover, & Bennett Thatcher, 2011; Weill & Woerner,
2013). Second, the alignment of the information security strategy in the large government
organization closely followed the discussion conducted in Chapter 2, Review of the Literature,
which illustrated possible types of strategy alignments within an organization, in general
(Wagner & Weitzel, 2012). It should be noted that the literature review considered literature that
was oriented and focused primarily from non-public sector organizations. The data collected
here represented public sector information security, in that it came completely from large
government organizations. The results then should reflect purely what public sector
organizations experience. For the third category, the analysis of the collected data looked at the
complex structure of an information security strategy. Resources, the fourth category might fall
outside the scope as a core category. Resources primarily aided in sustainment of the
information security strategy efforts and could be a factor in keeping it moving, affecting long
term changes, but not in the development of the strategy. The four categories are expanded in
the next four paragraphs to highlight an overview of how each of the four super group categories
were derived.
4.3.3.1 Proposed Roles Category
The first of the super categories was that of the roles category, which had CISOs
primarily expressing the need to keep compliance at the forefront, because of mandated,
regulatory law to report on system compliance utilizing recommended security controls as a
major part of their job (Corbet; 2014). In addition, most CISOs utilized other roles to varying
degrees that needed to be performed, such as having top down leadership, ensuring the public
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image, competing with other organizations, always changing their approach, adopting or
adapting to best practices, and or in rare occasions re-organizing to accept resource constraints.
4.3.3.2 Proposed Alignments Category
Alignments considered the way in which CISOs lined up goals to meet business and or
information systems goals and objectives. Additional alignments looked at how CISOs
performed security on their own and addressed daily breaches and incidents. Some CISOs also
expressed concern that they had no direction from leadership. Respondent T8 (personal
communication, February 19, 2014) stated, “But we do not have a written down strategy. We
make decisions as we go along. We do not have it written down, we just do it. It is not written,
it is in people’s heads,” which summarizes the lack of direction in some units. The CISOs made
the best of their unique situations addressing information security on their own. The categories
under the alignment super category were captured as business, business and information systems,
information systems, information security on their own, and ad-hoc or no security.
4.3.3.3 Proposed Complexities Category
Complexities of the information security strategy surfaced in every interview, be it from
the whole strategy being too complex to start or being as simple as the strategy being a three step
process used each and every day. The complexities involved with the information security
strategy surfaced throughout the whole process of strategy creation to finish and what the
strategy should be composed of: vision, mission needs, communications and collaboration,
knowing security, trust, buy-in, and developing a strategy.
4.3.3.4 Proposed Resources Category
CISOs expressed that resources as an area essential to keeping an information security
program operating, but was not essential for its formation. Resources are important to CISOs as
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attention was given to ensure qualified personnel are working for them, along with needing
recurring training and having appropriate security tools being made available for day to day use
in performing duties. Respondent F5 (personal communication, December 30, 2013),
emphasized tools when stating, “What tools are we using now and then six months down the
road and how that fits into the architecture.” Another category within the resources super
category was that of having enough budget to sustain operations, to purchase tools, hire
personnel, and keep the [security] skills current (Office of the Inspector General (OIG); (2013).
The results of the combining of categories into larger groupings of a similar nature also shared
the focus of the study shifting from the strategy as a focal point to that of the CISO being the
fulcrum or leveraging point.
4.3.4 Axial Coding Results
Through the continued use of the CRG, the researcher combed the collected data and the
35 proposed categories that advanced from open coding. Each proposed category was entered
into the CRG form and evaluated. Some ended up being very similar to others and the researcher
subsequently combined them together. As the process continued, the researcher began to group
unique, but similar categories together. As this continued, the first cut of grouping categories
under the roles grouping (Table 14, Role Groupings to Categories) showed one batch of similar
categories. Three other grouping also emerged from the CRG review process, for a total of 24
categories within the resultant four groupings. Table 15, Alignment Groupings to Categories;
Table 16, Complexities Groupings to Categories; and Table 17, Resources Groupings to
Categories emerged to capture the other possibilities that categories could be combined from
Table 12, Proposed Category Grouping. These four main groupings: roles, alignment,
complexities, and resources were then advanced to the selective coding process.
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Table 15. Alignment Groupings to Categories
Role Proposal
Category Nomination
CISO aligns ISS to business goals.
Business
Often business sets goals for CISO
CISO aligns with both business and IT
Business and Information
goals
Systems
CIO often dictates for CISO to align
Information Systems
Some CISOs have own budget and sets
Information Security
goals themselves
CISOs have no guidance and mostly
None
work on putting fires out. Use project
plans as startegy

Table 16. Complexities Groupings to Categories
Role Proposal
Category Nomination
Recognized the need to see a goal and
Visionary
have a vision for each goal
Prioritizing what matters in their
Mission Needs
program and according to whom it is a
priority for
Talking & getting message across is
Communications
crucial to success
Recognized security as primary first
Know Security
step in process
Customers must be able to trust CISO
Trust
Recognition that buy-in from leadership Buy-in
is fundamental to the program
The actual process of making a strategy Develop
(3 or 4 goals, max)

Table 17. Resources Groupings to Categories
Role Proposal
Category Nomination
Need to have adequate funds to operate Budget
the program
Must have appropriate tools to perform
Tools
inspection
Need to have qualified people to use
Personnel
tools and find security anomalies
Personnel need to obtain training to
Training
maintain skills
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4.3.5 Selective Coding
The researcher continued the analysis of the collected data into the final step of selective
coding to consider what makes an information security strategy complex; how it is formed; what
sustains it; how it lines up with other strategies; and what role(s) the CISO selected to meet the
tenets of the information security program.
The initial research problem stated the researcher should review the data collected and it
might produce an understanding of the complexities of an information security strategy. The
study should reveal what the differing roles are for an information security professional and the
ways in which an information security professional differentiates one information security
strategy from another. Additionally, the study might help identify how information security
strategies differ within a large government organization and the way in which the organization
might drive the information security strategy. The four large areas revealed from the study were
ones to look at roles, alignments, complexities, and resources. Each of which is key to
developing the core category of CISO actions to achieve a strategy.
4.3.5.1 Roles
The majority of CISOs expressed the main role category in use was compliance, it was
central to functioning in the organization. Conversely, a majority of CISOs also revealed that
couple of minor roles were not used frequently within the category. The main roles not used
frequently by information security professionals were public image, competitor, re-organization
and power relationships, of which, power relationships was not in use at all. The four major
roles in use by the information security professionals were compliance, continual change, best
practices, and top down (Seeholzer, 2012). Figure 2, Roles, illustrates the centrality of roles that
the CISO used. Compliance was the one all the CISOs used (depicted as central) and to varying
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degrees parts of the other roles were utilized in the public sector. The root or purpose of the
information security program was to protect and ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability
(CIA) of data and information systems entrusted to information security (Krutz & Vines, 2001).
The compliance role an information security professional uses was to classify each information
system according to guidelines published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) (Computer Security Division (CSD); 2004). The information security professional must
also comply with FISMA scorecard requirements (Burwell, 2013; Corbet, 2014).

Figure 2. Roles

Information security professionals also expressed the need for continual change, adapting to
events as they evolved over time between updates of their information security strategy. The
CISOs saw this in two ways. Illustrative of this was what Respondent E3 (personal
communication, December 26, 2013), who stated, “Within the CISO organization it is an
adaptive process of realizing that our priorities can change…operations tempo, threat movement,
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emerging technology and other factors in order to realize your overall vision.” First, continual
change meant that the business section of the organization continually changed the way in which
security was to operate and periodically levied new requirements on the information security
section, sometimes without prior coordination. Respondent E3 (personal communications,
December 26, 2013), said, “Basically, the ground rules must be prioritized then the stakeholders
can understand when they have skin in the game and when they need to prioritize; when and
where they need to re-prioritize against competing priorities.” Multiple CISOs confirmed that
their management did in fact change course several times over the entirety of a fiscal year. The
second method CISOs explained was a more agile approach, one in which they looked at the way
the information security professional should continually evaluate their progress towards meeting
the goals of their strategy and making adjustments as necessary. Many did not, but a few of the
CISOs did use their plan and adjusted it periodically over the course of the fiscal year.
Respondent P5 (personal communications, April 23, 2014), captured this when stating, “Some of
the priorities are out of your control. The organization will set them for you. The chief
information officer is going to set them and you are going to have higher organizational goals.
The priorities are set from up channel.” Those that did adapt, regularly met the objectives of
their strategy. Those that did not might have, but often just reacted to situations as they arose.
Information security professionals explored industry best practices as well. Best business
practices covered the entire range of activities from using step by step instructions of a keep it
simple basic instructional book (Olsen, 2007) to trying to achieve level five of a capability
maturity model integration (CMMI) framework (Bunker, 2012; CMMI Team, 2010).
Respondent J7 (personal communication, December 31, 2013), summed it up in saying,
“Information security strategy means to me that it is very, very simple, it is how we are going to
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accurately and effectively accomplish our mission. It is the stepping stones from point A to
point B and without honesty and a logical process, you will never have an accurate strategy…”
Information security professionals also reviewed and selected practices from business process
reengineering, and efficiency models like the plan-do-check-act (PDCA) and strengths,
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) methodology (Moen & Norman, 2009; Team
Free Management Ebooks (FME), 2014). Top down driven structures existed and the CISO
reacted as a result of being driven or driving information security with the work force. Many
CISOs had priorities placed upon them by upper management dictating or guiding how they
should perform the information security program. One respondent pointed out that the CIO can
change their direction when stating, “Priorities may also change by chief information officer
(CIO) mandated priorities. When the CIO says so, then it is so” (Respondent C7, personal
communication, December 17, 2013).” In driving their work force, CISOs also had some
autonomy to mirror image the top down driven nature by guiding or directing how their work
force performed. These were the roles observed from the interviews conducted with the CISOs
from the organizations. Another super category that helped them realize potential was through
resources and the ways in which CISOs utilized personnel.
4.3.5.2 Alignments
Some CISOs stated that information security has been seen as just an additional
expenditure by business, the information security program has far too often been given bare
minimums to meet regulatory law and then allowed to function in any way possible to meet the
additional regulatory requirements. Respondent S1 (personal communication, February 12,
2014) captured this when stating, “It is hard to get funding with so many competing priorities. It
is hard because information security is not seen, but when something goes wrong, everyone
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comes screaming.” CISOs that operate in an ad-hoc manner are left to address one issue after
another and do not have a formal strategic plan to work towards measuring whether they are
successful or not in accomplishing their information security program. Respondent P5 (personal
communication, April 23, 2014) identified the problem when stating they always tracked the
fires before working the strategy. “But, when fires do flare up, no matter where they happen, I
drop everything and then track those. We do work the CIO’s priorities after the fires are
extinguished, but we will address fires when they come up first.” The CISO organizations that
operate on their own tend to operate correctly, if the CISO operates correctly, but tend to fail if
the CISO is forced to accomplish tasks that increase risk across the organization. Figure 3,
Alignments, illustrates the possible alignments for information security strategies.

Figure 3. Alignments
Each organization operated differently, to meet their particular mission needs. The
researcher found that CISOs in each sub-section of the large organization had parts that were
similar and some that differed in their mission from the overall large organization. Each subsection or small unit aligned their information security strategy to meet mission need. All five of
the proposed alignments covered in Chapter 2 were in operation in the large organization and
among the different participant sub organizations. The two most numerous types of alignments
were the information security strategy aligned with both business and information systems
strategies and the second was that quite a few organizations operated in an ad-hoc fashion,
72

having no strategy and no internal system other than tactically moving to address one crisis after
another.
4.3.5.3 Complexities
As a part of the comparative analysis and combining of statements during the coding
process, several categories combined and made up the parts of what was termed the super
category of complexities of an information security strategy. This super category, complexities,
was divided up into the sub categories called: vision, mission needs, communications and
collaboration, knowing security, trust, buy-in, and developing strategy. Each of the sub
categories meshed into the others, but is also a component part of the entire super category of
complexities. Figure 4, Complexities, illustrates the connectedness of sub parts combining and
resulting in a coherent strategy based upon the goals of the information security professional,
business, and information security strategy goals.

Figure 4. Complexities
Vision really focused on the CISO having an outlook for the next three to seven years as
to where they wanted to take the organization in a secure manner, identifying risk, and informing
leadership of actions necessary to address risk. “We look towards the next five to seven years in
our projections via the roadmap,” (Respondent A0, personal communication, December 11,
2013). The CISO considered mission needs to set priorities for the information security strategy.
He or she conferred with stakeholders to ensure security gets involved at the start of a project
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instead of finding out about projects affecting security that have already been deployed. CISOs
must communicate and collaborate with everyone involved in information systems and business.
Respondent P5 (personal communication, April 23, 2014) stated it best as, “Information security
takes a collective, collaborative approach that is rare for an organization that can actually achieve
it. So your information security strategy is really one of collaborative team building and
focusing on value to the business unit.” Communications must take place whenever there is the
chance to discuss threats and take advantage of opportunities to talk about mitigations to threats
(Scully, 2014).
Knowing security is key when working to get security built into the beginning of the
systems development lifecycle. CISOs must investigate emerging technology, keeping one step
ahead of what is currently in use on the network. The ability of CISOs to build trust, to keep
stakeholders informed, and gain their assurance that they are kept apprised of all issues involving
security is another key element. Respondent L9 (December 19, 2013) posed the question about
trust as, “How strong is your relationship, the level of support and trust by your leadership?”
Leadership must receive correct information from CISOs in order to gain and to maintain the
trust of leadership. The CISO must also be able to market security to executives throughout the
organization and obtain buy-in or support from top level executives. Buy-in is fundamental to
the success of strategy (Hu, Dinev, Hart, & Cooke, 2012). The art of developing the strategy
takes place by building it from the start using all the pieces of the complexities super category,
keeping it small, but encompassing all of the information security program. CISOs stated the
strategy should be limited to three or four overarching goals. One respondent touched upon it
when stating, “The information security strategy needs to be simple. Complexity is the enemy of
strategy,” (Respondent L9, personal communication, December 19, 2013). And, Respondent V8
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(personal communication, January 31, 2014) narrowed it when stating that, “…seven or eight
elements gets down to three or four goals. Then we can look at an information security strategy
in a three year plan.” The goals should be achievable within the allotted timeframe of the
strategy. And, most important of all, the goals should be written in such a way as to allow them
to be used and checked periodically for completion.
A comparative analysis of CISO statements showed that the complexity of an information
security strategy is a chain of events, yet it is interconnected and meshed. Figure 5,
Complexities, illustrates the chain of events flowing from one end to the other for
accomplishment. The information security strategy is a dynamic operation centered on the
vision of the CISO and aligning to the goals of a higher order strategy. Developing a strategy is
an active process requiring constant attention. It also requires shaping through alignment in the
organization and leadership from the CISO actively working through various roles.
4.3.5.4 Resources
CISOs highlighted the need for resources again and again when asked the question of
“…what a successful information security strategy needed..,” (Table 5, Interview Question
Rationale) to sustain it. Resources consisted of four categories, those of training, qualified
personnel, tools, and budget. CISOs wanted to have recurring training for personnel, especially
information security skills, but also a greater emphasis on business training--in order to learn
how to communicate with stakeholders. Respondent J7 (personal communication, December 11,
2013) pointed this out when saying, “…qualified staff to support the priorities of the
organization is paramount.” Figure 5, Resources, depicts how the categories of resources
related, how they are interactive with one another, and that each category helps to sustain the
super category. One of the other primary goals of the CISO was
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Figure 5. Resources
that they must also hire qualified personnel. CISOs recognized they were competing with
commercial sector organizations that can pay much more for equivalently trained security
personnel. This made it much harder for the CISOs to keep experienced personnel. CISOs noted
that training was complicated and could cause problems in that while training up personnel is
good, once they were trained many could move on to higher paying jobs. Figure 5, Resources,
illustrates that training is an integral part of being qualified personnel. The challenge for the
CISO was to identify what skills workers needed and attempt to gain the opportunity of
obtaining the necessary skills to build all the workers to the same level. The CISOs wanted to
allow for people to stay and develop. Some CISOs wanted to have career paths to help personnel
remain and develop through the ranks of being a novice, learner, peer, trainer, and eventually a
supervisor. The CISO must always be proactive in developing the individual, allowing them to
mature or run the risk of people moving to other jobs. Mentoring is a prime requirement. Not
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only should the CISO be training his or her replacement, but also explaining what goes on in
their decision making process. Teaching the recruits was the means for critical thinking and how
the CISO arrived at their decisions would help to recruit and to also cement relationships with
management.
Tools are also necessary to keep current with ever evolving malware. CISOs were always
searching for ways to improve software tools through added capabilities and or automation, to
get the full usage of the features of the software tools. Lastly, it is imperative to have a budget to
allow security to function efficiently. The CISO must become business development experts.
The CISO must find and build the examples that can show return on investment, not so much in
security, but as a result of security, in how much the organization can save in prevention (i.e.,
keeping the organization from exploits and the action that saves the organization a certain
amount of money per asset, because a compromise usually results in lost time, productivity,
assets, and or the possibility of even needing to replace an asset). Figure 5, Resources, depicts
how all of these categories meld together to form the super category of resources which are the
way the information security strategy is sustained.
Having identified the four super categories, the researcher sought to allow each to fit
together in different ways and see how the super categories would identify the core category or
central phenomenon (Brown, et al., 2002; Hallberg, 2006). Figure 6, Super Categories, shows
the four super categories and how each affects the outcomes of the others. The arrows indicate
dependence of one category upon the others. There are multiple ways to weave the categories
together into a story. The process of meshing or weaving the categories together using selective
coding should reveal the core category in the results.
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Figure 6. Super Categories
4.3.6 Selective Coding Results
The researcher used the second tool of grounded theory, called the reflective coding
matrix (RCM) as the tool for the grounded theory coding process. According to Scott and
Howell (2008), obtaining the theory or model from the data is the most difficult part of the
coding process. The selective coding step results from the building of a story extracted from the
data. By presenting the data from the collected categories in the form of collected categories one
can deduce a logical flow as the relationships are built from the coding process. The story is of
how all these super categories feed together and focus upon telling the story from the CISO’s
viewpoint in how they hierarchically work together and culminate into a core category (Hallberg,
2006).
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To capture the results of the axial coding step, the researcher borrowed and used the
second tool that Scott and Howell (2008) introduced that was called the reflective coding matrix
(RCM), which allowed comparative analysis to proceed in whittling the selections down into a
core category from the four super category groups. The process of the RCM assisted the
researcher in developing a form to capture the processes, properties, dimensions, contexts, and
Table 18. Reflective Coding Matrix
Core Category
Processes

Reflective Coding Matrix
CISO Actions to Achieve a Strategy
Selecting the proper
Adjusting to the
Figuring out
role
proper alignment
complexities of
strategy

Obtaining enough
resources

Properties

Observe and adapt to
the climate

Align to proper
direction

Decide on what is
right

Lobbying for stuff

Dimensions

Selecting to either be
management driven,
assume public image
worth more, seek to
outdo everyone, adopt
best possible result
from others, reinvent
the structure, always
change, and or
comply with law

To be business,
information system,
or information
security driven, or
have no direction

Market for Buy-in
Gain trust
Know security
Have a vision
Limit the scope
Establish
priorities
Adopt proactive
approach

Have qualified
people
Get enough tools to
perform
information
security tasks
Acquire the correct
training
Gain enough
funding to
complete the
strategy

Contexts

Support the mission

Coordinating and
deciding linkages

Establishing
mutual goals

Scoping reality

Modes for
understanding
the consequences

Bounds the proper
approach

Reaching
compromise that
meets objectives

Collaborate on
results

Having sufficient
funds to obtain
needs

modes for understanding the consequences put forth through the CRG. The RCM depicted
several interactions between the aspects of the core category (processes, properties, dimensions,
contexts, and modes) in the left hand column for each of the four super categories or categories
(roles, alignments, complexities, and resources) in the successive columns moving from left to
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right. Each assesses an aspect of the category and how it reflects into the core category of ‘CISO
actions to achieve a strategy.’
Through the steps of filling in and assessing the areas of the RCM, the results were clear
that the actions taken to achieve the strategy itself were the most critical part of the core category
and one the CISOs also started time after time during the interviews. They, the CISOs, were the
core to taking the action in achieving a strategy. Table 18, Reflective Coding Matrix illustrated
the intricate relations of the four super categories into the core category of ‘CISO actions to
achieve a strategy.’ The researcher used the selective coding process to build the story of the
core category selection and the emergent theory that came forth using the RCM elements
(Hallberg, 2006; Pandit, 1996; Scott & Howell, 2008).
From the data collected and analyzed, the researcher presented a way to depict a
breakdown of the super categories discovered from the data. Figure 7, Mapping the Categories,
captured in an image from breaking down each of the super categories into the categories found
to comprise each individual super category. This figure shows each category (underlined) as a

Figure 7. Mapping the Categories
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part of each super category (circled) and that the relation to the central theme was yet to be
structured. Figure 6, Super Categories, depicts how the dependencies exist between the super
categories. The way in which a model emerges is if the CISO is inserted at the start of the
decision making process; meaning that the CISO defines how to utilize roles, takes part in
alignment, participates in complexities, and lobbied for resources then the ISS is formed.
In order to arrive at the core category, the researcher compared and contrasted the four
super categories on their own merits to possibly identify the central or core category. The
categories listed in Table 19, Table of Outcomes to Select, as 12 possible sequences of
accomplishment of a theory covered all the possible combinations of the four super categories.
Assuming the CISO is the only participant in investigating the roles of information
security strategy and having a direct effect on the information security program, then there would
be three areas that are out of their direct control: complexities, alignment, and resources.
Resources would be beyond the scope of this study, since the evaluation here is upon
investigating the roles of an information security strategy. Resources would be useful for
evaluating sustainment and supporting day-to-day activities. Hence, resources would be apt to
be in the last position of the four super categories. This action would eliminate outcomes 2, 3, 4,
6, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12. Outcomes 1, 5, and 7 would be the only viable ones. Since the CISO
starts with a role, outcome 1 and 7 could also be eliminated leaving outcome 5 as the only
selectable outcome to evaluate.
To consider outcomes 1 and 7, the study focuses on actions taken to move the direction
of an information security program towards achieving confidentiality, integrity, and availability
of data and systems. Alignments may receive input from the CISO, but is mostly arrived at by a
combination of business and or information systems decisions to support mission along with the
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Table 19. Table of Outcomes to Select
Outcome
1
Complexities Alignments
2
Complexities Roles
3
Complexities Resources
4
Roles
Complexities
5
Roles
Alignments
6
Roles
Resources
7
Alignments
Roles
8
Alignments
Complexities
9
Alignments
Resources
10
Resources
Complexities
11
Resources
Alignments
12
Resources
Roles

Roles
Resources
Alignments
Resources
Complexities
Alignments
Complexities
Resources
Roles
Alignments
Roles
Complexities

Resources
Alignments
Roles
Alignments
Resources
Complexities
Resources
Roles
Complexities
Roles
Complexities
Alignments

CISO. In lieu of having any alignment, the CISO may institute a self-sufficient approach on its
own or opt to practice no alignment, just operate from one situation to the next. Hence,
alignments should be considered of importance, but placed in the second position of the equation
above complexities in the outcome, further justifying outcome 5.
Complexities may exist in varying stages from the three stakeholders within a range of
strategy being derived from information systems, business, or information security. The actual
strategy results from the interaction or lack of interaction between stakeholders of the
organization. The CISO creates the strategy based upon inputs from the stakeholders. The CISO
must then consider all the factors or complexities of building the strategy that would then align
with the alignments agreed upon with management and resources that are available. Hence, the
complexities fit in the third position after alignments, but before resources thus limiting outcome
to number 5.
As an alternative view of the previous analysis and one that uses storylines for the
analysis, the researcher began to view as a CISO would from the data collected. The CISO must
select the story most likely to succeed in meeting management’s selection of a goal and align
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next with the role to the mission of their organization using supplied resources. CISOs look at
the summarized possible outcomes from Table 19, Table of Outcomes to Select, and read the
story of using super categories in possible outcomes to create the most viable one. Thus, each
plot would read as follows:













Develop complexities of an information security strategy, consider strategic alignment,
execute necessary roles, and be supplied by resources
Develop complexities of an information security strategy, execute necessary roles, be
supplied by resources, and consider strategic alignment
Develop complexities of an information security strategy, be supplied by resources,
consider strategic alignment, execute necessary roles
Execute necessary roles, develop the complexities of an information security strategy, be
supplied by resources, and consider strategic alignment
Execute necessary roles, consider strategic alignment, develop the complexities of an
information security strategy, and be supplied by resources
Execute necessary roles, be supplied by resources, consider strategic alignment, and
develop complexities of an information security strategy
Consider strategic alignment, execute necessary roles, develop complexities of an
information security strategy, and be supplied by resources
Consider strategic alignment, develop complexities of an information security strategy,
be supplied by resources, and execute necessary roles
Consider strategic alignment, be supplied by resources, execute necessary roles, and
develop complexities of an information security strategy
Be supplied by resources, develop complexities of an information security strategy,
consider strategic alignment, and execute necessary roles
Be supplied by resources, consider strategic alignment, execute necessary roles, and
develop complexities of an information security strategy
Be supplied by resources, execute necessary roles, develop complexities of an
information security strategy, and consider strategic alignment
From the statements in the bulleted list, analysis could help eliminate the majority of

assertions. The first set of three bullets can be dismissed, since the ‘develop complexities of an
information security strategy’ is the outcome of alignments working together to reach consensus.
The strategy captures the agreements. The second set of three bullets, ‘executing necessary
roles’ captures the essence of what a CISO does as a result of aligning to a strategy, which is a
primary outcome. The third set of three bullets, ‘consider strategic alignment’ is the action a
CISO performs to gauge leadership of the organization, aligning it to the way in which the
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strategy is crafted and is an outcome of the alignment of leadership working together to reach
consensus. Alignments work in tandem with the strategy as it is the way work is done to codify
the strategy. The fourth set of three bullets, ‘be supplied by resources’ considers the sustainment
of the information security program after consensus is reached among leadership for a role and
an alignment and a strategy or a plan is codified to propose the way to achieve the information
security strategy, but it is the actions taken by the CISO which implements the strategy. The
CISO must choose the role they play in moving towards completion. Thus the outcome would
come from the second set of three.
Looking again at the second set of three, beginning with the words ‘execute necessary
roles,’ The CISO investigates management’s alignment, as one where security operates on its
own, with information systems, with business, or with the cooperation of business and
information systems, recognizing who is in charge and working through the process to reach an
outcome. This is the alignment that the CISO moves towards to achieve the goals of their
information security program. The complexities are the vision of the CISO to gain alignment
and consensus to achieve the desired outcomes of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
data and the information systems they are responsible for and to work with available resources
provided to accomplish the information security program.
The story from the matrix presented in Table 19, Table of Outcomes to Select, shows the
best outcome of a CISO as the ability to select a role, determine an acceptable alignment and
match complexities to a desired outcome. The CISO accomplishes all these actions while
working within the scope of available resources. The CISO should “execute necessary roles,
consider strategic alignment, develop the complexities of an information security strategy, and be
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supplied by resources.” The following discussion looks at an analysis of the data after selecting
this narrative or story of the super categories.
The researcher needed to select and support the statement best capturing the results of
open and axial coding. Using the reflective coding matrix, the researcher combined the super
categories and found that the CISO recognizes and selects a role or combination of roles they
deem necessary to perform the mission of information security. The CISO seeks to align their
vision of the strategy to the direction of the organization. In their organization they may need to
be with business, information system, on their own, or some combination of the three. The CISO
then begins to construct the strategy to achieve the vision and align to stakeholder’s requirements
using the supplied resources. Evaluating the processes or casual conditions in the reflective
coding matrix, the information revealed that CISOs focused on the roles chosen to implement a
strategy. Role selection was seen as the primary area the CISO could control, because they had
the freedom to decide in which way to operate. Role selection turned into a complicated process
that they had to consider the outside factors of alignment and the strategy developed to meet their
mission which also had to support organizational goals. While designing the way in which their
part of the organization formed, the CISOs, by consensus stated their program must be forward
looking. Respondent Q3 (personal communication, January 23, 2014) stated, “The information
security strategy boils down to and in its simplest definition is the forward looking strategy a
leader has in their head to address information security problems of today, but also for tomorrow
as well.” They needed to have a strategy of a manageable size consisting of three to four goals,
and these goals needed to be achievable or attainable within a set period of time. Mostly this
was defined as a fiscal year, from October first through September thirtieth of the following year.
The strategy must define what is important and what is to be protected. It must also foster a
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culture of security presenting ways in which to develop and foster a participative community
amongst users of the organization. Information security professionals must be communicative
and collaborative around the organization. Cultivating and germinating security to the general
populace of the organization. The next section considers the CISO as the linchpin of the
organization and the deciding factor in which way the information security program leans using
their role, alignment, and complexity (strategy) in the organization.
4.4 The Result
The previous sections considered the categories used by the CISOs and discovered ways
to work and implement their information security programs. In this final section, the analyzed
data is studied to produce the steps a CISO follows to investigate their role with the information
security strategy. Using the data collected, following the discovery process the CISO
investigates where or how they should align with leadership and choose the best role to start
with. If receptive, the CISO aligns with business and or information systems, and participates
with the development of a strategy, forming the framework of a strategy. If leadership is not
receptive, the alignment either leans towards information systems or remains within the
information security environment leaning on regulatory requirements as their force for
compliance by law. If there is an unlikely situation where leadership does not participate, yet
dictates that no security shall be practiced or only to a level such as that which only obtains
system certification and accreditation to operate. The organization devolves into an ad hoc
situation wherein the CISO is always reactive and does not achieve desired goals. Respondent J7
(personal communication, December 31, 2013), stated it best by saying, “Unfortunately, our
priorities are based on a reactive methodology. I have priorities clearly communicated to
leadership, to my staff, and to others, but unfortunately being we are so short staffed, we cannot
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execute those priorities effectively and when something happens all those priorities are pushed to
the side to fix a top priority at hand.” The data in the study revealed that none of the programs
reached the extreme end of having no security, but in certain situations some CISOs were
required to implement systems without proper controls, especially where new technology was
involved.
The way to explain this is that the CISO works to align their strategy by speaking directly
with leadership. From the start, the CISO seeks where in the alignment process they are situated.
Whether they are operating on their own, or with information systems, business, or both. The
formation of a strategy is devised by a consensus process of the three stakeholder groups
(business, information systems, and information security) working together or by being directed
and agreeing to some form of direction. A discussion ensues back and forth from the CISO
during the forming stage of the strategy and there are some possible extra steps back through
leadership as the CISO confers with leadership on a direction (in the alignment step), until
consensus is reached. Once the strategy is formed, the CISO identifies the goals listed and
makes the decisions to select a role for implementation of the strategy to achieve the goals.
Figure 8, CISO Actions to Achieve a Strategy, depicts this aforementioned process.
Once decided, the role selected was applied, the strategy is implemented and resources
are utilized to accomplish the implementation. The CISO then makes the final decision as to
which role to select that is then used to work the strategy goals and implement them for the
completion of the information security program, realizing the agreed upon goals. Resources help
to implement the strategy and achieve goals. Figure 8, CISO Actions to Achieve a Strategy,
depicts this emergent method of action, the story of how CISOs in a large organization
systematically operated.
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Figure 8. CISO Actions to Achieve a Strategy

As a step by step explanation of the process, the CISO initially chooses a role (most often
one of compliance, based in law). The CISO coordinates with stakeholders to decide upon on
alignment. The alignment step is a cyclic action between CISO, role, alignment, Strategy
(formation), until stakeholders form a strategy. Once the strategy is formed, the CISO in the
second part selects role(s) to sustain operations for implementing the strategy and is indirectly
assisted with resources to achieve the strategy at the end.
Conspicuously, the four super categories have dependencies that show relationships
between roles, alignments, complexities, and resources (refer to Figure 6, Super Categories). A
breakdown of the four super categories is covered under the axial coding results section and is
illustrated in Figure 7, Mapping the Categories. Taking figure 6, Super Categories and Figure 7,
mapping the categories, the researcher deduced the interplay into Figure 8, CISO actions to
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achieve a strategy. In most organizations, CISOs have assumed a role, have an alignment, and
they have limited resources, but most do not have a strategy. They are left to fend for themselves
in many situations where incidents occur. As Respondent Q3 (personal communication, January
23, 2014) reported, “If I sum it up, we react to fires every day and would not be able to keep up
with it. So when you have an information security strategy, it would allow you to be proactive
and address the problems.”
CISOs have assumed a role. By the analysis, many CISOs were left to find out their own
roles for any given situation. Either management did not give any direction as to what was
required and the CISO ended up creating their own strategy or the CISO just reacted to each
incident as it transpired. The role most often assumed was that of compliance, as depicted in the
super category roles (refer to Figure 2, Roles) and depicted in the lower right hand corner of
Figure 7, Mapping the Categories. The compliance role had a central position, as all CISOs
identified compliance as a must do activity. This section details the CISO action to select an
initial role.
Most CISOs had an alignment. The information gleaned from an analysis of the data
collected showed there were two main alignments for CISOs. Firstly, there was a large number
of CISOs who were aligned with the CIO (information systems) and business. These CISOs had
a relationship built with their leadership and kept them informed of risk and abided by the
decisions leadership specified. Secondly, there was a large number of CISOs who had no
alignment and were left out of the leadership’s activities and essentially these CISOs were
always performing information security duties in a purely reactive mode. “Unfortunately, our
priorities are based on a reactive methodology (Respondent J7, personal communication,
December 31, 2013). They were always working on cleaning up incidents as opposed to having
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a strategy that could look to prevent events from transpiring. The CISOs without an alignment
did desire to know what leadership was involved with and ultimately could help leadership make
informed decisions, but were excluded from taking part in system development prior to
implementation. There were a few CISOs who operated solely under the direction of the CIO
and a single CISO who worked directly with the business function. For the most part, the CISOs
that associated and worked with business and the CIO were from larger units in the organization.
The CISOs from smaller units in the large organization were left to either create their own rules
or were always remediating situations management found themselves in by ignoring information
security. This covered the interactions between CISOs, roles, and alignments as depicted in
Figure 8, CISO actions to achieve a strategy.
Most CISOs did not have a strategy. When pressed closer, the CISOs stated that they did
not have a formal strategy. The CISO that had only an informal strategy stated they did not have
time to write a formal strategy and they simply performed duties as they were required, operating
very tactically patching one incident after another without gaining any headway in the process.
One CISO stated they had a formal strategy, but it was not approved yet. Respondent Z7
(personal communication, February 19, 2014), stated, “There is nothing in place, we try to build
a management directive, internal for an information security strategy, but it is not formalized, so
I will not elaborate on it until it is finalized.” A few other CISOs said they utilized the CIO’s
strategy as their own. It was most preferable to have their own, but the CISO stated they would
accept the larger organization’s strategy or even working under the CIO as a back up plan. Many
stated they referred to the strategy written by the CISO from the headquarters or lead unit in the
organization. All stated that the strategy involved a lot of hard work. The work involved teams,
coordination, and mechanics for developing the vision against mission needs and arriving at
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goals for information security. Much of the development process goes beyond the scope of the
study here. The main thrust being to coordinate the inputs to capture goals, and codify them with
other stakeholders in their organization. This embodies the hard work of forming the strategy
through interactions of stakeholders, CISOs, and teams who work for the CISO.
Having the strategy, the cycle would be almost complete, but the influence of resources
does play a part in investigating roles of the information security strategy. Most CISOs have
limited resources. Some CISOs had an abundance of funds and were able to guide personnel
into career paths beneficial to the large organization. Most had budgets that would only allow
some assets to be expended towards personnel development. Resources were a vital enabler of
the CISO’s ability to perform the information security program. Funds were dispersed and the
CISO always balanced the addressing of risk by its highest priority. Often the CISO did not have
enough, but did make do with the amounts of funding allotted to them.
Therefore, as presented in Figure 8, CISO Actions to Achieve a Strategy, this represents
all the actions associated with the CISO achieving strategy. The interview question rationale
was sound and resulted in the grounded theory coding process of all the collected data to reveal a
theory. The story emerging from the data and hence the theory coming forth from the data fits
this statement: The CISO selects a role to align with the mission and develops a strategy
(complexities) that uses available resources. The statement can be shortened form is the CISO
actions to achieve a strategy and in a longer form could be the following story. The CISO
starting with compliance as a role works with business and information systems in alignment to
develop a strategy that addresses mission risk adequately with a budget to support qualified
personnel adequately trained and equipped with pertinent tools. The CISO adjusts the role to suit
the needs of addressing mission risk to the business and information system executives.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion, Implications, Limitations, and Recommendations
5.1 Introduction
Through this study, the research has been around investigating information security
strategy and the roles a CISO can choose to implement it (Chen, et al., 2010; Leidner, et al.,
2011), how the information security strategy and role selection can be advanced and to be more
proactive (Seeholzer, 2012). And, that this advancement can contribute towards yielding a
proactive implementation of a strategy through the proper role selection, alignment direction, and
usage of resources towards accomplishing objectives. Future research may validate the theory
that emerged from the collected data in Chapter 4 and resultant model of the CISO actions to
achieve a strategy.
5.2 Conclusion
The results of this study led to an understanding of the complexities with information
security strategy in a large government organization. It revealed a theory that can help CISOs to
ascertain whether certain types of information security strategy are preferable to other forms of
information security strategy and how to tailor it. The study might also prove helpful to evaluate
how information security strategies differ within large governmental organizations, by using the
model to investigate specific scenarios, depending upon the variables supplied for all the inputs.
This study’s findings might feed into an advanced theory of role selection to assist information
security professionals in selecting role(s) appropriate to implementation of an information
security program.
The researcher asserted that from the review and analysis of the available literature and
data collected, that several results came from the analysis. One of the expected results found that
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many of the role categories advanced in the literature review, held as written. Some participants
expressed the roles with differing names, but the categories tracked along the same explanations
advanced for the categories in the review of the literature. It did come to pass that four of the
role categories proved to be somewhat inconsequential in a large government organization.
Those roles were public image, competitor, re-organization and power relationships. The
categories identified in roles, even though found inconsequential in the large government
organization, may however hold up under educational, commercial, or other public sector
environments. The review of the literature did advance several cases in the commercial sector
for the categories listed as inconsequential.
The section of the literature review on alignment of strategies did find the same
categories, but with differing results. The majority of CISOs in the public sector had fewer
written strategies as opposed to the ideals presented in the literature review. This was verified
from the interviews, as CISOs expressed their support of the business and information systems
strategies, but identified the lack of their own information security strategies. Further, the
interviews revealed a severe lack of models for dealing with strategy inside of information
security offices within organizations.
The results of the collected data revealed more than just definitions of information
security and basic information about the information security program. Most of the CISOs went
into detailed discussions of obstacles and challenges they faced on a near daily basis as they
struggled to prevent data loss breaches and incident responses to the new threats and exploits the
network is exposed to from every entry point (Hutchins, Cloppert, & Amin, 2011; OIG, 2012;
Suddaby, 2006). Table 20, Challenges and Obstacles, gleaned the major challenges CISOs faced
within their organizations.
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Some CISOs led complicated discussions of how information security supported and
often supplemented the business strategy, adding value in unexpected areas. For example, in
cases where security is involved from the start, it gets built in and prevents unnecessary
expenditures later on. The researcher conducted the interviews using a repeatable process, with
the results that all the interviews reflected unbiased views from the differing sub organizations of
the large organization, that all ended up supporting an overall organizational security program
(Duffy, et al., 2006; Hirose, Itao, & Umeda, 2012; Wimpenny & Gass, 2000).
Table 20. Challenges and Obstacles
Respondent

Challenge Faced

G7

-Helping the organization see the big picture of information security was often a
challenge. Often I had to devise creative ways, many times behind the scenes to
get some semblance of information security incorporated into the system.
-The challenge for us is that we have a lot of things to do, but our budget is so
severely slashed. So it has been really hard to do. 
-It was a challenge to try and align all the various strategies, plans and guide
books for the overall organization. Also, the White House came out with things
to make it harder still to align all the pieces.
- We are always fighting over budget, having the budget authority to obtain the
necessary equipment. The CIO has a different prioritization which tends to be a
challenge.
- I have the challenge of sub organizations. I have to build on information
security strategy that is compelling enough that others will want to align with
ours. I do not do it in a vacuum. I don’t want to put it in a paper and make it
something they must, but rather something they went to support and adopt. What
do I need to push to have them get behind it. Get them involved rather with you,
then you can get buy-in. 
-Often times the challenge of the job here is that we have all the responsibilities
and accountability, but we do not have the authority. Even though the Clinger
Cohen Act gives it, we do not have the authority. You have to have the ability
to have political influence to get them to move priority to catch up and get done.
- There is a problem in quantifying the risk. With this, it is challenging to build
a repeatable process. I built the proposed model for characterizing threat, but I
do not know if it reached the point of repeatability. It is very hard to build the
repeatable process and without a repeatable process it is even harder to get
measurements or metrics of the process.

H8

M7

V8

X9
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5.3 Implications
Since the fundamental understanding of information security roles used to implement an
information security strategy in an organization is lacking, most implementations in government
organizations equated the information security strategy to a technically related solution,
implementing tools and monitoring controls (Seeholzer, 2012). This was supported by the
interviews conducted with the majority of CISOs as they highlighted their ad-hoc security
environments. The challenge is to distribute the information presented in this study, so that the
CISOs can assist executives in aligning strategic goals and objectives and help them in
developing roles that fit into an agreeable alignment. The use of constructivist grounded theory
complicated and required interpretive skills to correctly delve into the collected data and extract
the categories from the myriad levels of responses given by the executives taking part.
Considerable time was necessary to arrive at a coherent story through coding of the data and use
of comparative analysis.
5.4 Limitations
The main limitation was obtaining unbiased responses from the participants. For each of
the interviews, the researcher kept the interviews unrehearsed, not allowing the CISOs to
preview the questions prior to the interview, it was a spontaneous discussion of the questions.
The researcher also limited the boundary of the questions, remaining explicitly in the arena of
information security strategy and the roles an individual could assume to meet the objectives and
goals. A delimitation for this study kept the study focused solely on the questions without
deviating from the subject; maintaining the same core questions with each participant. The
researcher also kept distant with the participant in order to obtain unbiased responses.
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Another limitation was the population selected the number of CISOs in the geographic
area was limited. The generalizability to the greater population was a consideration, in that the
research utilized individuals residing within the National Capital Region of the United States,
generally around the greater Washington, DC area. Even though this study queried respondents
from each of the sub units of the large government organization, it might not represent all
organizations. Further, since it is difficult to assimilate the key factors from all studies within the
information security domain, it cannot be assumed that all roles influencing information security
strategy were represented within this study. It could be surmised that other roles not part of this
study may impact an information security strategy of an organization.
Finally, while participants were assured of non-disclosure and that data was collected in a
way to minimize respondent reservation, it would be difficult to ensure respondents were
completely free of mistrust. There could be some underlying fear of providing information
security information to an outside source. This assumption has been seen as problematic when
conducting research into information security areas (Kotulic & Clark, 2004).
5.5 Recommendations
The phenomena or properties of the roles a CISO must consider needs to encompass how
to address threats, vulnerabilities, and weaknesses common to the information security strategy
(Ransbotham, Mitra, & Ramsey, 2012). The information security field stands on the precipice of
going from a purely reactive world, addressing threat as it is discovered to be one of a more
predictive nature of the threats being encountered prior to an actual exploit. CISOs currently and
expressly focus on a reactive approach documenting and implementing static controls to protect
data and assets under their purview. This must change in that as the protections increase the
threat moves to other more unprotected areas. For example, the main CISO of an organization
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lobbied and obtained permission to block webmail, the single greatest entry point of malware,
through directed emails, attachment downloading, and execution. Now, threat actors have
moved and evolved their attacks towards other attack vectors as Heartbleed (Durumeric, et al.,
2014) and Bash/Shellshock did (Security Research and Emergency Response Center of Anity
Labs (Anity CERT), 2014; Trend Micro Threat Research Lab (TMTRL, 2014) in an attempt to
gain logon credentials. CISOs need to adapt and change from reactive towards a more proactive
approach. The beginnings of this shift were gleaned from the interview responses to the
interview questions, such as “…what capabilities are necessary for a successful information
security strategy?” (Chapter 3, Table 5, Interview Question Rationale). This question found a
shift in response from CISOs of the desire to move from reactive towards a proactive outcome.
Respondent M7 (personal communication, April 14, 2014) said the CISO must, “Clearly
articulate the risk of a decision by management that would put data at risk and it must be
proactive and not reactive in decisions.” The researcher gained a vision for a trend of moving
from reactive, through an interim stage of a hybrid approach with both reactive and proactive
approaches, and then towards a more proactive, threat driven approach. Figure 9, Trends,
illustrates the move from a reactive to a proactive information security program.

Trends

Protect Data &
Assets

Operations &
Risk

Reactive

Hybrid

Threat Driven

Proactive

Figure 9. Trends
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Future work can expand into how this could take place and how roles, alignments, and
strategy (complexities) adapt to the new fluid environment. Lastly, CISOs indicated that for
years, the model of a hardened perimeter has held and was easily defended against. Now
however, with the introduction of cloud, mobile, big data, virtualization, and other emerging
technologies, those boundaries no longer hold. How does the CISO change to react to the new
paradigm of network layers vice a perimeter defense model? These would be areas to explore in
the future.
The relevance and significance of the study adds to the knowledge base around
understanding the complexities of information security strategies and roles associated in
adopting methods to accomplish the goals and objectives of the information security strategy.
The problem developed in that the complexity of an information security strategy has not been
explored for developing strategy and the selection of roles to support it. The population segment
of the information security community affected by this phenomenon are executives in
information security, the CISOs and other executives charged with oversight of information
security for an organization. The problem ranges over all of the organizations with information
security programs and to a lesser extent in smaller organizations. The focus of the study
centered on large government organizations, but might be helpful if the emerging model scales
down to smaller organizations or could be scaled to fit any size organization in the public sector.
Adapting the findings by applying the theory may result in tailoring an information security
strategy and role development for organizations.
Other studies might attempt to address the problems of complexity, but possibly might
not arrive with a theory for selecting a role development model for information security strategy.
Without the theory developed here, the perpetuation of role selection schizophrenia will
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continue, with a reactive selection of roles to address immediate problems as they occur instead
of evaluating an overall direction and proactively investigating root causes to eliminate the core
of the problem. Too often the easier route is to gain temporary results, than to address the root
problem. Avoiding it will only see the problem resurface six months to a year later in the same
vein; albeit with slight modifications, such as the newest variant of a virus to fool the heuristic
analysis of an anti-virus program. The introduction of Stuxnet (Lee, 2012), followed by Flame
(Bencsáth, Pék, Buttyán, and Félegyházi, 2014), and then by Regin (Symantec Security
Response (SSR), 2014) illustrates the adaptive nature of the threat that CISOs and businesses
must adapt to in order to secure data and assets.
This research study addressed the issue of information security strategy complexity by
offering a theory that allows the practitioner to assess, analyze, and adapt roles for meeting the
objectives and goals of the information security program through said strategy. Implementation
of the theory will assist in proactively addressing the need to get past the cyclic reactive nature of
information security and get to a proactive culture of security moving forward in an organization.
Acceptance of the theory and testing of various organizational sizes and types will prove its
generalizability and usefulness across a spectrum of organizations. Future studies may consider
other qualitative methods. Also, further implementation may lead to organizations adopting the
theory, creating a model and quantifiably test the theory for empirical data.
5.6 Summary
This study presented research that has implications for practitioners of information
security. On one level, organizations having reactive information security strategies will find
guidance to assist in their efforts to identify which role to select to accomplish their information
security program goals and objectives. Organizations with large and unfocused information
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security can utilize the findings to focus their role selection to proactively accomplish the goals
and objectives identified in their information security strategy. Having a more focused selection
process will save an organization money and time. Finally, the theory developed from emergent
data will allow a CISO to adapt to changing situations according to the data supplied by outside
factors. Once establishing the theory and testing empirically, then further usage of the theory
may take place to develop metrics and measures to lend to the quantitative testing of the model
and provide further empirical evidence of the model’s effectiveness.
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Appendix A

Interview Questions
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1.

In your opinion, what is information security strategy?

2.

What does security strategy mean to you? And to this organization?

3.

What is the role you take to accomplish information security strategy?

4.

Can you elaborate on how you arrive with your strategic priorities for information
security?

5.

Can you describe the model (framework or system) of your information security
strategy?

6.

Can you describe how the implementation of information security strategy is tracked?

7.

Thinking of security strategy, how do you manage the priorities of the large
organization?

8.

Can you explain what capabilities are necessary for a successful information security
strategy?
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Appendix B:
Initial Overall Analysis
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Responde
nt
A0
B3
B8
C7
D2
E3
F5
G7
H8
I5
J7
K2
K5
L9
M2
M7
N5
O9
P4
P5
Q3
R2
S1
T5
T8
U2
V8
W3
X4
X9
Y4
Z7

X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X

Compliance
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

Power Relationship

X

X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X

Re-Organization

X

X

X
X
X
X

Best Practice
X

X
X
X
X

Continual Change

Competitor

Public Image

Top Down

Ad-hoc

On its own

IT

X

X
X

Bus/IT

Business

Not Needed

X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X

Don't have one

Have one

Reactive

Proactive

Strategy

Table B. Overall Interview Analysis

X

X
X
X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X
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Table B1, Overall Interview Analysis, consists of an overall evaluation of each of the interviews
and classifying them under four separate areas. First, each respondent’s interview was evaluated
for being proactive, reactive, or having elements of each within the interview responses given to
the interviewer. The second area considers the respondent’s status as having a strategy of some
sort, not having one, or stating they do not need a strategy. By some sort, the person either had a
written strategy, one in the process of approval, or used a higher level organizational information
security strategy. The two instances of stating they did not need a strategy stems from the fact
that the respondent stated they used the chief information officers (CIOs) strategy instead of an
information security strategy. The third area under review evaluated the strategy alignment that
the respondent steered their organization towards, either business, business and information
systems, information systems, information security, or ad hoc alignments. There were instances
where a respondent exhibited more than one type of alignment. The fourth area evaluated the
respondent’s role as described in response to the interview questions as either one of the
following or a combination of multiple roles: top down, public image, competitor, continual
change, best practice, re-organizer, power relationship, and or compliance.
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